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Governmental Immunity and the Release of
Dangerous Inmates from State Institutions:
Can the State Get Away with Murder?
INTRODUCTION
W E are all too often reminded of brutal aspects of our society:
newspapers and television news depict daily the violent as-
saults, robberies, rapes and murders that have become common-
place in modern life. Statistics show that nationwide over one mil-
lion violent crimes occur each year.' The inevitability of becoming
a victim of criminal activity has become a growing concern among
many Americans.2
Serious questions are raised by the prevalence of crime.
What, for example, of the victim who has suffered at the hands of
a person with a history of violent criminal activity who has re-
cently been released from a prison or mental institution? Is the
victim's injury or death as inevitable as it may be perceived? Is
he/she entitled to compensation? If so, who is responsible?
To the victim or to his/her family it often appears inconceiv-
able that the prison inmate or mental patient could have been re-
leased in the first place. Especially if the crime was a serious one,
the victim and his/her family will look to the courts for redress
against the state, generally the only party able to compensate vic-
tims or their families.'
The concerns of the victims and their families would appear
to favor stricter release standards and longer terms of confine-
ment. Other interests, however, pull in a different direction. Pro-
grams such as parole for prisoners and "open door" treatment for
mental patients exemplify firmly-rooted policies designed to facili-
tate the inmate's rehabilitation and reintegration into society.4
1. See FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNrrED STATES 41 (1980).
2. See generally Symposium on the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime: Fore-
word-Remarks by Governor James R. Thompson on the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent
Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867 (1982).
3. See generally Carrington, Victims' Rights Litigation: A Wave of the Future?, 11 U. RICH.
L. REV. 447 (1977).
4. See generally Note, Liability of Mental Hospitals for Acts of Their Patients Under the Open
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These programs demonstrate a legislative awareness that the
rights of the inmate cannot be forgotten; to the contrary, they
must be balanced against the competing interests of society.' Since
the power to release is usually granted directly from the legisla-
ture, the state traditionally has been insulated from liability for
these types of actions, based on the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity, which has its roots in the notion that "the king can do no
wrong. '"
Recognizing, however, that governments perform many activ-
ities which are non-governmental in nature,7 Congress passed the
Federal Tort Claims Act,8 waiving the United States government's
immunity from suit. Many states have followed Congress's initia-
tive and have enacted similar statutes.9 This waiver of immunity is
in no way absolute. Fearing that the very process of government
Door Policy, 57 VA. L. REv. 156, 156-60 (1971); E. HOAG, CRIME, ABNORMAL MINDS, AND THE
LAW 53 (1981).
5. See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
6. This phrase was coined by Blackstone when he wrote in 1765: "The king can do no
wrong.. . . The king, moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking
wrong: he can never mean to do an improper thing: in him is no folly or weakness." 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *238-39. See also Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officials:
Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1963); Note, Separation of Powers and the Discretion-
ary Function Exception: Political Question in Tort Litigation Against the Government, 56 IOWA L,
REv. 930, 933-40 (1971) (documenting the history of the immunity doctrine); Borchard,
Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4-9 (1924).
7. See, e.g., Moffitt v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 34 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
8. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982).
9. See, e.g., N.Y. COURT OF CLAIMS ACT § 8 (McKinney 1975); ALASKA STAT. §
09.50.250 (1983); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-821 (1956); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 810 (West
1954) ("Tort Claims Act" posits general immunity, with enumerated exceptions); CoLo.
REv. STAT. § 24-10-102 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (West Supp. 1982); HAWAII REv.
STAT. § 662-2 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 6-903(a) (1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-1 (Burns
Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 25A.3 (West 1946); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6103 (Supp.
1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8104 (1964) (limited to enumerated negligent acts);
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-403 (1980); MINN. STAT. § 3.736 (1946); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 11-45-1 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.600 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (liability limited to
the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, or to damage from property in a "dangerous
condition"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-102 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,209 (1976); N.J.
REv. STAT. § 59:2-2 (1937); N.M. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8522 (Purdon 1930); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 9-31-1 (Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-77-230 (Law. Co-op. 1983) (limited to the
negligent operation of a motor vehicle); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-201 (1980) (posits gen-
eral immunity from suit and enumerates exceptions); TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 § 4
(Vernon 1925); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-3 (1973) (posits general immunity from suit with
enumerated exceptions in tort); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5601 (1973); VA. CODE § 8.01-
195.3 (Supp. 1983); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.92.090 (Supp. 1983-1984); Wvo. STAT. §§
1-39-105 to 1-39-111 (enumerated exceptions to general tort immunity).
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might be hampered if liability were incurred for its every program
or policy decision, the federal government and many of the states
have created an exception to this waiver for claims based on the
performance of "discretionary duties" of government employ-
ees.10 The exception provides that if the act in question involved
"discretion" or "planning," immunity results. Actions which are
merely "ministerial" or "operational," on the other hand, are not
protected."
This Comment will closely examine the applicability of the
discretionary function exception (and common law or statutory
immunity applied by state courts) to cases where inmates are re-
leased by correctional and mental institutions. It will be helpful to
see how courts have treated immunity outside release situations.
This Comment will begin by looking at the federal cases which
have dealt with this issue, and will conclude with a survey and
analysis of New York's approach to immunity.
It will be argued that the sovereign immunity doctrine should
not be applied to release cases. The discretionary function excep-
tion has proved to be an inadequate standard in ascertaining the
applicability of immunity outside release situations. Artificial and
arbitrary labelling of activity as "discretionary" or "planning" (as
opposed to "ministerial" or "operational") has inevitably led to
confusion among the federal courts as to where the line between
these two levels of activity should be drawn. This labelling has
provided judges with little or no guidance in deciding cases apply-
ing this "standard." As a result, courts have been forced to decide
10. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982); ALASKA STAT. §
09.50.250(1) (1983); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 662-15(1) (1976); IDAHO CODE § 6-904 (1976);
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3(6) (Burns Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 25A.14(1) (West
1946); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(d) (Supp. 1983); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §
8103(2)(c) (1964); MINN. STAT. § 3.736(3)(b) (1946); NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-8,210(4) (1943);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8524(3) (Purdon 1930); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205(1) (1980);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(1) (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5602 (1973).
The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982) reads that immunity is not
waived for
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Govern-
ment. exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether
or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or per-
formance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or
not the discretion involved be abused.
11. See generally infra notes 15-86. For a general survey of case law applying the discre-
tionary function exception of the FTCA, see Annot., 36 A.L.R. FED. 240.
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these cases on what is essentially an ad hoc basis.
A second reason is submitted for the inapplicability of sover-
eign immunity to release cases: Since one of the major purposes of
sovereign immunity is to maintain the separation of powers (i.e.,
to preclude judges from implementing legislative policy by award-
ing damages to those victimized by certain acts of government), 2
it should be applicable only when suits against the government
would tend to threaten the government's ability to govern. It will
be argued that holding the state liable for negligently releasing
dangerous inmates who subsequently, and foreseeably, commit vi-
olent crimes has no such inhibiting effect on the government's
ability to legislate or execute policy.
It will be concluded that, since release committees act essen-
tially in a quasi-judicial capacity, they should be afforded a quali-
fied judicial immunity. Unlike absolute immunity, which precludes
judicial review of governmental activity in spite of any alleged
negligence, release decisions should be reviewed for propriety in
the decisionmaking process. If the release committee is presented
with all the relevant facts (e.g., an inmate's background and psy-
chological reports), and makes a reasonable determination in light
of these facts, then the committee (and vicariously the state)
should be immune, even though the decision may have been
wrongly made. On the other hand, if the forum is not sufficiently
judicial-like, immunity must be stripped in its entirety, and tradi-
tional tort standards should be applied.
Applying the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity to
quasi-judicial bodies such as release committees is in contradiction
to the basic tenet of governmental immunity, which is designed to
protect the sovereign's mandate to govern. Instead, immunity has
come to shield decisions which are merely administrative in na-
ture, and which affect the rights of identifiable individuals rather
than the public in general. 13 Divested of procedural and substan-
tive safeguards, determinations by tribunals empowered to release
inmates often do not account for consequences which are foresee-
able-that certain released inmates may be unfit for reassimilation
into society-often leading to the injury and death of innocent
persons.
12. See infra notes 48-65 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
494 [Vol. 33
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The doctrine of sovereign immunity should not be carried
over into the area of inmate releases. Courts must be allowed to
review release decisions; if the decisionmaking process is shown to
be negligently defective, and the released inmate foreseeably in-
jures someone, the injured plaintiff must be allowed to recover
against the state. x4
I. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
A. Setting the Stage: A Brief Look at Federal Governmental Immunity
In 1946 the federal government waived its immunity from
tort liability by enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).1 5
One exception to this general rule of liability, found in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a), is that for "an act or omission of an employee of the
government . . based upon the exercise or performance or fail-
ure to perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
federal agency." 16
1. Non-release cases. Two doctrinal aspects of these cases
must be separately explored:
-"Planning" versus "operational" levels: Is there really a distinction?
Determining what constitutes discretion and what does not
has proven to be no simple task for the courts. In Dalehite v. United
States,"7 the seminal case under the FTCA, plaintiffs brought suit
for personal injury against the United States resulting from the
explosion of fertilizer being loaded for export overseas. The fer-
tilizer was manufactured by the federal government and sent to
Germany, Japan, and Korea in order to increase productivity and
thereby help feed people from these countries shortly after the
conclusion of World War 11.18 Despite the fact that the ingredi-
ents of the fertilizer rendered it particularly susceptible to explo-
14. The issue of the liability of the official(s) who released the inmate is outside the
scope of this article. As to this issue, see generally Note, Absolute versus Qualified Immunity for
Public Officials Acting in Quasi-Judicial Capacities, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1513 (1978); Annot., 5
A.L.R.4th 773 (1981).
15. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982).
16. Id. at § 2680(a). For the full text of § 2680(a), see supra note 10. For further
discussion of the discretionary function exception see Jayson, 24 FED. B.J. 153 (1964);
Note, The Discretionary Exception and Municipal Tort Liability: A Reappraisal, 52 MINN. L.
REV. 1047, 1052-56 (1968); Note, supra note 6.
17. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
18. Id. at 19.
4951984]
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sion, the government permitted shipment without warning of its
danger. The Court ruled that even though the government was
negligent in manufacturing, packaging, and loading the fertilizer,
these negligent acts fell within the discretionary exception since
they were performed under the direction of a plan developed at a
high level of authority.' 9 Governmental liability was thereby
precluded.
[D]iscretion . . . includes determinations made by executives or administra-
tors in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where
there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion. It necessa-
rily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in
accordance with official directions cannot be actionable."0
While Dalehite seemed to hold that discretion in policy-mak-
ing served as an umbrella for protecting the negligent implemen-
tation of that policy as well,2 later courts pulled back from this
restrictive standard.22 Within four years of Dalehite, the Supreme
Court decided Indian Towing Co. v. United States,23 which held that
governmental negligence in failing to check and repair an inoper-
ative lighthouse was actionable, and Rayonier Inc. v. United States,
24
which allowed recovery for negligent fire-fighting. Both cases ap-
peared to fall safely within the Dalehite holding, which purport-
edly protected the acts of subordinates carrying out directions ac-
cording to "policy. ' 25 In a more recent circuit court of appeals
case 28 it was thus noted that "[i]f the Tort Claims Act is to have
the corpuscular vitality to cover anything more than automobile
accidents in which government officials were driving, the federal
courts must reject an absolutist approach to Dalehite, and that in-
terpretation is rejected by Indian Towing and especially by
Rayonier."
27
19. Id. at 39, 40.
20. Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added).
21. For a discussion on policy-making versus implementation of policy, see infra note
119.
22. See Cerrone & Hardy, Governmental Liability in Massachusetts, 14 SUFFOLK L. REV.
1262, 1263-70 (1980). See also Swanson v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 217, 219 (N.D. Cal.
1964).
23. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
24. 352 U.S. 315 (1956).
25. See supra text accompanying note 20.
26. Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1967).
27. Id. at 246. See also Note, Remedies Against the United States And Its Officials, 70 HARV.
L. REV. 827, 895 (1957). Dalehite, however, may find new life from the most recent Su-
[Vol. 33496
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In rejecting the rigid Dalehite test, federal courts looked to
Rayonier and Indian Towing as distinguishing between decisions
made at the planning as opposed to the operational levels of gov-
ernment.28 A new test was devised whereby high level policy deci-
sions fall within the protective net of section 2680(a) while acts
performed during the operations necessary to carry out this policy
do not.29 In United States v. Hunsucker,"° for example, plaintiff sued
preme Court pronouncement on the subject. In United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao
Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 104 S. Ct. 2755, 2764 (1984), the Court noted that
the discretionary function exception was not at issue in Indian Towing, since the govern-
ment in that case conceded the exception was not applicable. The Court concluded that
Indian Towing and Eastern Airlines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 189 (D.C. Cir.), affd
per curiam sub nom. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955) (also purporting
to limit Dalehite) "cannot be taken as a wholesale repudiation of the view of § 2680(a) set
forth in Dalehite." Id. at 2764-65 (citation omitted).
Nevertheless, by itself S.A. Empresa does little to resurrect Dalehite. The Court shies
away from attempting to define the scope of Dalehite and instead speaks in generalities,
most particularly commenting that "the basic inquiry concerning the application of the
discretionary function exception is whether the challenged acts of a Government employee
... are of the nature and quality that Congress intended to shield from tort liability." Id. at
2765. Notwithstanding the Court's vagueness, the gates appear to have been opened for
the government's argument that the Supre-ne Court has rejected the notion that Dalehite
has been eroded in any way, and that this implicitly overrules the tidal wave of cases rely-
ing on Indian Towing and Rayonier. This Pandora's box could potentially reshape the scope
of the discretionary function exception by overruling progressive judicial interpretation on
this subject over the past 25 years.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Hunsucker, 314 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1962); Mahler v.
United States, 306 F.2d 713 (3rd Cir. 1962); Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221
F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964);
Swanson v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1964). In Swanson, the court noted
that:
The planning level notion refers to decisions involving questions of policy,
that is, the evaluation of factors such as the financial, political, economic, and
social effects of a given plan or policy....
The operations level decision, on the other hand, involves decisions relating
to the normal day-by-day operations of the government. Decisions made at this
level may involve the exercise of discretion but not the evaluation of policy
factors.
Id. at 220.
29. See United Air Lines, Inc., 335 F.2d at 393. The court there noted that
[c]ases which illustrate the line of demarcation are as follows: discretionary to
undertake fire-fighting, lighthouse, rescue, or wrecked ship marking services,
but not discretionary to conduct such operations negligently, discretionary to
admit a patient to an Army hospital, but not discretionary to treat the patient
in a negligent manner; discretionary to establish a post office at a particular
location, but not to negligently fail to install handrails; discretionary to establish
control towers at airports and to undertake air traffic separation, but not to
conduct the same negligently; discretionary to reactivate an airbase, but not to
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
for damages incurred by flooding due to the government's negli-
gent diversion of waters from a nearby air force base located on
high ground. The federal government decided to reactivate the
airbase, which had been unused since World War II.31 During re-
activation, extension of runways required construction of conduits
to replace drainage ditches which were cut off.32 These conduits
were insufficient to divert the flood waters, and plaintiff's land was
frequently inundated with water.33 The court held that while the
decision to reactivate the base was made on the planning level, the
negligent construction of the drainage ditch occurred on the op-
erational level and thus was not protected by section 2680(a).34
A second, albeit similar, test distinguishes between activity
which is discretionary as opposed to ministerial.3 5 Discretionary ac-
tion, much like planning, connotes the formulation as opposed to
the execution of policy, the latter which is deemed ministerial.
While the planning/operational and discretionary/ministerial
dichotomies have served to soften the impact of Dalehite, they
have often proved difficult to apply. In Smith v. United States,36 for
example, the court noted that:
Unless government officials make their choice by flipping coins, their acts
involve discretion in making decisions. . . . It is not a sufficient defense for
the government merely to point out that some decision-making power was
construct a drainage and disposal system thereon in a negligent fashion: and
discretionary for CAA to conduct a survey in a low flying, twin engine airplane,
but not for pilots thereof to fly negligently.
(Citations omitted). See also Harris & Schnepper, Federal Tort Claims Act: Discretionary Func-
tion Exception Revisited, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 161, 171-72 (1976).
30. 314 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1962).
31. Id. at 100.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 101.
34. Id. at 105.
35. See Elgin v. District of Columbia, 337 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Henderson v.
Bluemink, 511 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Generally, federal courts other than the District
of Columbia circuit rely on the planning/operational distinction while many of the states
and the District of Columbia apply the discretionary/ministerial standard, which developed
in the law of municipal corporations. See Driscoll v. United States, 525 F.2d 136, 139 (9th
Cir. 1975). Nevertheless, the language is often applied interchangeably. See, e.g., Cohen v.
United States, 252 F. Supp 679, 687 (N.D. Ga. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 389 F.2d 689
(6th Cir. 1967) (holding that the discretionary function exception is "properly limited to
[activity conducted on] the planning level and not the operational level; and to acts of a
governmental and not a ministerial function."); Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d 475, 480
(5th Cir. 1982).
36. 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1967).
498 [Vol. 33
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exercised by the official whose act was questioned. Answering these ques-
tions ... is not aided by importation of the planning stage-operational stage
standard argued for by Smith. Such a distinction is specious. ... [I]n diffi-
cult cases it proves to be another example of a distinction "so finespun and
capricious as to be almost incapable of being held in the mind for adequate
formulation.1
3 7
While recent cases have continued to pay lip-service to the
planning/operational distinction, Smith is representative of the in-
creasing judicial awareness that the line between the two is often
difficult to discern.38 In Baird v. United States, 9 for example, plain-
tiff sued the federal government for damages and injuries in-
curred when his aircraft crashed during landing. Plaintiff had re-
lied on a government-published chart which informed pilots of
the length of the longest runway in hundreds of feet as well as
whether or not it was lighted.40 Plaintiff erroneously inferred
from the symbols "L-28" that the lighted runway was 2800 feet
long.41 In actuality, the lighted runway was not that long, but was
instead 220 feet shorter than expected, causing plaintiff to over-
run it and crash.42 The court held for the government on the
37. Id. at 246 (quoting Frankfurter, J., in Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61
(1959). Recovery in Smith was denied on the grounds that discretion of the Attorney Gen-
eral is absolute. For further criticism of the planning/operational distinction in federal
cases see Payton v. United States, 636 F.2d 132, 138-39 (1981), rev'd in part on rehearing,
679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982); Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975);
Moyer v. Martin Marietta Corp., 481 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1973); Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S.
797, 811 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38. See, e.g., Moyer, 481 F.2d at 598. Moyer involved an action against the United States
for the death of a test pilot who died when the ejection seat of his aircraft was accidently
triggered while the airplane was still on the ground. The court noted:
We have difficulty applying the decided cases as to negligence in exercise of a
discretionary function to the facts presented here. The facts in this case bring it
very close to the line separating actions covered by the FTCA and those beyond
its reach because governed by the discretionary function exception .... We
agree with the United States that the selection of B-57 aircraft ... constituted
the exercise of a discretionary function. Equally the determination of the num-
ber of such aircraft to be purchased also constituted the exercise of a discre-
tionary function. But, coming down to the acceptance of a system of the air-
craft, such as the pilot's ejection seat and its mechanism, which, if negligently
designed or constructed posed a safety hazard to an individual operating the
aircraft, we hold that the discretionary function exception's sweep falls short of
immunizing the United States from liability.
Id. at 598. See also infra note 119.
39. 653 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1981).




grounds that even though the chart may have been ambiguous
and misleading, it conformed to Inter-Agency Air Cartographic
Committee (IACC) specifications. 43
To have allowed recovery for negligence in drawing up the
flight charts would have, in effect, amounted to holding the gov-
ernment liable for what was clearly a policy decision, notwith-
standing the fact that the policy may have been defective. Presum-
ably, if IACC's specifications were not riddled with ambiguity, but
"L-28" were mistakenly printed on the chart, then plaintiff would
have been allowed to recover on the grounds that the negligence
occurred in the operational stage. Under the Baird logic, which
effectively immunizes policy decisions, a policy which, for exam-
ple, allowed soldiers to conduct target practice in public parks
would deny recovery to a child who was accidentally shot by a
stray bullet on the theory that there can be no liability. The act
complained of merely represents the carrying out according to in-
structions of a defective policy. In essence, then, there is no differ-
ence between negligent implementation of a sound policy and
proper implementation of a negligent policy-other than the fact
that only in the former instance does plaintiff have a viable cause
of action."
This distinction is illustrated in a recent Supreme Court case,
United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig
43. Id. at 440. The court noted that "[t]his challenge thus goes to the heart of the
IACC's deliberative and judgmental activities in designing and approving the extent of
detail to be included in aeronautical sectional charts." Id. at 441.
44. This absurd result has prompted federal courts to often scrutinize the policy itself
to ensure that the act complained of falls within the agency's own specifications. See, e.g.,
Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974), which involved a suit against the
United States by a woman whose injuries resulted when she orally ingested live virus polio
vaccine, causing her to become a permanent paraplegic. An issue before the court was the
degree of discretion that the Division of Biologic Standards (DBS) had in interpreting a
regulation concerning the release of polio vaccines. The court, in affirming judgment for
the injured plaintiff, noted that:
Even were we to concede that discretion was otherwise conferred upon DBS by
the regulation, no discretion was conferred to disregard the mandatory regula-
tory command. In discounting test results that were required to be considered
significant, DBS acted outside the scope of the authority conferred by the regu-
lation. The violation of a non-discretionary command takes what otherwise
might be characterized as a "discretionary function" outside the scope of the
statutory exception.
Id. at 1068-69 (citations omitted).
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Airlines).45 That case stemmed from an airplane fire occurring
while the plane was in flight. In one of the two cases before the
Court, 124 of the 135 passengers died from asphyxiation 6r the
effects of toxic gases released by the burning plane. Respondents,
the airline seeking damages for the destroyed aircraft and the
families of the deceased passengers, sued the Civil Aeronautics
Agency (predecessor to the FAA) for the negligent certification of
the airplane on the theory that it did not satisfy applicable safety
regulations.
In holding for the government, the Court looked solely to
procedures designed by the FAA to monitor safe manufacture of
airplanes. Noting that the FAA does not have the manpower to
adequately monitor all aspects of airplane production, the Court
gave weight to the FAA's argument that it followed internal pro-
cedures by merely "spot-checking" manufacturers. 46 Since the
FAA complied with its own procedures, the Court reasoned the
activity was discretionary, even though the spot-check program
"necessarily took certain calculated risks. ' 47
Conspicuously absent from the Court's opinion was any dis-
cussion on how dangerous or unreasonable the FAA's internal
procedures might have been. Instead, since policy was carried out
according to the rules, the government was protected from suit.
Under this rationale, it would be simple to justify almost any gov-
ernment action, so long as the action was performed pursuant to
policy. In contrast, the same activity performed in contravention
of "policy" is negligent and would not be protected by section
2680(a) since it constitutes implementation of policy.
-The Separation of Powers Doctrine
Undoubtedly, one reason that Congress was unwilling to com-
pletely abrogate sovereign immunity was to maintain the separa-
tion of powers.48 The concern was that the judicial branch would
interfere with the legislative or executive branch in its formula-
tion or execution of governmental policy.49 Congress clearly did
45. 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984).
46. Id. at 2768.
47. Id.
48. Note, supra note 16, at 1055; Note, supra note 6; Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 511
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Payton v. United States, 636 F.2d 132, 138 (1981), rev'd in part on rehear-
ing, 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982).
49. See generally Herzog, Liability of the State of New York for "Purely Governmental" Func-
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not envision all torts of government employees to fall within the
ambit of the discretionary function exception. The legislative his-
tory of the FTCA evidences a Congressional intent to protect only
that activity which is legislative in nature (such as administrative
rulemaking), as well as the implementation of that "legislation":
[The discretionary function exception is] designed to avoid any possibility
that the act may be construed to authorize damage suits against the Govern-
ment growing out of a legally authorized activity, such as a flood control or
irrigation project, where no wrongful act or omission on the part of any
Government agent is shown, and the only ground for suit is the contention
that the same conduct by a private individual would be tortious, or that the
statute or regulation authorizing the project was invalid. It is also designed
to preclude application of the act to a claim based upon an alleged abuse of
discretionary authority by a regulatory or licensing agency-for example,
the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Foreign Funds Control Office of Treasury, or others. It is neither desira-
ble nor intended that the constitutionality of legislation, the legality of regu-
lations, or the propriety of a discretionary administrative act, should be
tested through the medium of a damage suit for tort. The same holds true
of other administrative action not of a regulatory nature, such as the expen-
diture of Federal funds, the execution of a Federal project, and the like.50
Some courts began to show concern that, discretionary or
not, many decisions made by government officials are often not
legislative in nature and should not therefore be protected. A se-
ries of cases originating in the District of Columbia illustrates this
progression.5
1
In Calomeris v. District of Columbia,52 decided only two years
after Dalehite, plaintiff, administratrix of her husband's estate,
sued the District of Columbia General Hospital alleging her hus-
band died as a result of negligent medical treatment. The court of
tions, 10 SYRACUSE L. REV. 30 (1958). '
50. Tort Claims Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,
77th Cong. 2d Sess. 33 (1942). See also Swanson v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 217, 220
(N.D. Cal. 1964), where it was held that "[t]he planning level notion refers to decisions
involving questions of policy, that is, the evaluation of factors such as the financial, politi-
cal, economic, and social effects of a given plan or policy."
51. Id. at 268. The FTCA is not applicable to the District of Columbia. See Douffas v.
Johnson, 83 F. Supp 644 (D.C. Cir. 1949). Traditionally, immunity in that jurisdiction ap-
plied to "governmental" as opposed to "proprietary" functions. Later courts, however,
have begun to replace the governmental/proprietary standard with the discretionary/min-
isterial one. See, e.g., Elgin v. District of Columbia, 337 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Urow v.
District of Columbia, 316 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Spencer v. General Hosp., 425 F.2d
479 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
52. 226 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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appeals affirmed dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that
medical care for the indigent sick is a governmental function pro-
tected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
In sharp contrast to Calomeris is Elgin v. District of Columbia,
53
decided in 1964. Plaintiff, a minor, fell into a hole adjacent to a
school building while engaged in a required recreation program
on the school playground. The complaint alleged negligence in
failure to provide a rail or other safeguard around the depressed
area. In reversing the district court's dismissal of the complaint,
the court of appeals stressed that to be deemed "governmental,"
it must be shown that judicial redress would jeopardize the quality
and efficiency of government itself.
Almost from the very moment of creation by the courts of an immunity ini-
tially resting upon the ancient dogma that the king can do no wrong, the
judges have been alert to insist that the king be acting as such at the time
injury occurs. . . The capacity and the incentive to govern effectively are
arguably not enhanced by the prospect of being sued by those citizens who
may be adversely affected by the choice eventually made. . . By the same
token, in those areas of governmental action where the reason for the rule
does not apply, the rule itself is disregarded....
We are not persuaded, however, that the function of repairing broken
guardrails imposes upon the District determinations of such delicacy and dif-
ficulty that its ability to furnish public education will be ponderably impaired
by liability for neglect in failing to make such repairs."
In 1969, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit decided Spencer v. General Hospital.55 Spencer presented a
situation nearly identical to Calomeris, which the District relied on
as controlling. Nevertheless, the court rejected the District's argu-
ment and held that Elgin overruled Calomeris since there was no
distinction between the operation of hospitals and schools with re-
spect to the imposition of tort liability.56 In a concurring opinion,
Judges Wright and Bazelon criticized the protection of activities
solely on the grounds that they are labelled "governmental" in
nature. Noting that plaintiff's claim was for medical malpractice,
they continued that "[t]his is not to say that the performance of
an operation does not involve judgment and discretion. The point
is that medical, not governmental, judgment and discretion are in-
53. 337 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
54. Id. at 154, 156-57.
55. 425 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
56. Id. at 482.
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volved."57 The concurrence concluded that while
it is not a tort for government to govern, . . . I would not want to take the
flat position that the government is immune from paying for the conse-
quences of the adoption of every policy, however neglectful that policy
might be of the bodily security or the property of those affected by it.58
Finally, in a 1975 case, Downs v. United States, 9 the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reiterated the notion that the sover-
eign immunity doctrine was not designed to sweep all governmen-
tal activity under its protective umbrella. That case concerned the
hijacking of a small passenger airplane in Nashville, Tennessee.
The hijacker ordered the plane to be flown to the Bahamas.
When the plane landed in Jacksonville, Florida for fuel, FBI
agents refused to allow the refueling, even though the pilot had
signalled that the hijacker was armed and dangerous.6 0 After the
hijacker allowed the co-pilot and an associate to deplane to bar-
gain for fuel, the FBI shot at the airplane's engines and tires to
prevent takeoff. The attack provoked the hijacker to shoot and
kill his wife, the pilot and himself.6" Survivors of the victims sued
the United States, alleging negligence in the FBI's handling of the
hijack attempt. The government relied on the discretionary func-
tion exception, contending that the FBI agent in charge had the
"discretion to make an on-the-scene judgment.
'6 2
The Downs court, conceding that the situation called for the
use of discretion and judgment, nevertheless rejected the govern-
ment's argument. Judge Celebrezze, writing for a unanimous
court, noted that the discretionary function exception immunizes
government employees only when they are formulating policy. 3
57. Id. at 489 (Wright, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
58. Id. at 489-90 (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57 (1953) (Jackson,
J., dissenting)) (citations omitted).
59. 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975).
60. Id. at 994. The court noted that the pilot also signalled that in his opinion the
agent's intervention would prove disastrous. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 995.
63. Id. at 996. In dictum, Celebrezze also asserted that the first part of 28 U.S.C. §
2680(a) immunizes the government from liability for the actions of employees who exercise
due care in implementing policy as set forth in a statute or regulation. Id.
At first blush, this seems to indicate a great disparity between activity which is con-
ducted pursuant to statute (which is immunized even if it implements policy) and activity
which is conducted without statutory authority (immunized only if policy is being formu-
lated). The added requirement, however, that activity conducted pursuant to statute must
504 (Vol. 33
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Since the FBI agents were not involved in formulating policy,
their judgments did not rise to " 'the nature and quality' which
Congress intended to put beyond judicial review."64 The court
further agreed with one commentator who asserted that only an
administrator's exercise of a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial
function should be protected under the discretionary function
exception. 5
2. Federal release cases. In Fair v. United States,6 plaintiffs sued
the federal government for the death of three persons killed by
an Air Force captain after he had been released from a govern-
ment hospital. The captain had previously threatened the life of
one of the victims, and this was known by the base commander
and the Air Force doctors. The decision to release was made de-
spite knowledge on the part of the Air Force doctors treating the
patient that he had previously threatened the decedent's life.6 7
Without elaboration, the court held that the discretion vested in
the Air Force medical staff was at the operational level, thereby
rendering defendant liable for its negligence.6 8
be exercised with due care annihilates the distinction. Since "with due care" implies non-
negligently, negligent implementation of a statute, such as a negligent decision to release
an inmate, does not appear to be protected. Conversely, if the decision is made without due
care (i.e. non-negligently) there is no need for governmental immunity, since the abroga-
tion of immunity does not absolve the plaintiffs from proving negligence.
64. Id. at 997 (citing Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 841 (1967)).
65. Id. (citing Note, supra note 27, at 896).
66. 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956).
67. Id. at 290. The patient's target was a student nurse, Miss Cooper. Along with Miss
Cooper, two bodyguards hired to protect her against the patient were also killed.
68. Id. at 293. See also Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966),
which involved the shooting death of the former wife of an Air Force pilot. In Underwood,
the Air Force had been notified that one of its airmen, Edward Dunn, had assaulted his
former wife with a crowbar. A colonel's observation that Dunn "was practically on the
edge of a nervous breakdown," id. at 95, led to Dunn's hospitalization for psychiatric care.
While Dunn was hospitalized, Mrs. Dunn visited the Air Force base and told a sergeant
that she was frightened for her life since Dunn had previously attacked her and also fol-
lowed her on occasion. The sergeant, who knew Dunn, concluded that Dunn had the po-
tential for inflicting harm on his former wife. This information was relayed to Dunn's psy-
chiatrist, although a written note was not made and the psychiatrist was transferred off the
base. Dunn was subsequently released while under the care of a second psychiatrist who
was never informed of Mrs. Dunn's conversation with the Air Force sergeant or of the
sergeant's observations. Shortly after his release, Dunn, who was not under any restric-
tions, checked out a pistol and shot his former wife to death.
The government's reliance on the discretionary function exception was disposed of in
quick fashion. The court merely noted that "[t]he negligence of [the first psychiatrist] in
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More recently, in Rieser v. District of Columbia, '9 action was
brought by the father of a woman who was raped and strangled
by Thomas Whalen, a parolee. Whalen had a history of prior vio-
lent crimes against women7 0 and, at the time of the incidents giv-
ing rise to the case, was a prime suspect in another rape and
double murder 1 which occurred in the apartment complex
72
where he worked as a maintenance man. Whalen was forced to
leave his job at the complex because of the murder investigation.
Although Whalen's parole officer was aware of Whalen's record as
well as the investigation into the rape-murders, he recommended
the parolee for maintenance work at another apartment complex.
The parole officer did not notify Whalen's employer of the prior
murder or rape offenses or his status as a suspect in the murders
under investigation. After learning that Whalen was a suspect in a
third murder involving a sixteen-year-old girl living at his former
place of employment, his parole officer recommended revocation
of Whalen's parole. The parole board declined in light of the ab-
sence of "hard facts" of Whalen's guilt, instead ordering only that
the parole officer "supervise [Whalen] closely. ' 7 3 Shortly thereaf-
ter, Whalen entered Rebecca Rieser's room, where he raped and
strangled her.
not transmitting [the information which Sergeant Grover obtained from Mrs. Dunn] is
much further removed from a discretionary function. . .than was the negligence involved
in Fair .... Id. at 98.
69. 563 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1977), modified, 580 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc).
For an in-depth discusssion of Rieser, see Note, Parole Board Liability For the Criminal Acts of
Parolees: Rieser v. District of Columbia, 8 CAP. U.L. REv. 149 (1978).
70. Rieser, 463 F.2d at 464-65. The court noted that, at age 13, the parolee, Thomas
Whalen, killed an elderly woman whom he accused of "exciting him sexually." Six years
later, while on conditional release from a state hospital for the insane, Whalen assaulted a
female cab driver and received a criminal sentence of 6 to 18 years. After serving 9 years,
Whalen was again released, this time on parole. Id. at 464-65.
71. Id. at 464-68. After Whalen's parole in 1971, he was employed as a maintenance
worker for an apartment complex. Because of his prior history of assaults on women, and
because of his refusal to take a polygraph test in connection with the incident; Whalen was
believed to be involved in the rape-murder of a woman at the complex where he worked,
as well as the murder of her small child. Although he was forced to leave his maintenance
job at the complex, he was hired by another apartment complex in a similar capacity. It
was there that he raped and murdered plaintiff's deceased.
72. Id. The parole officer referred Whalen to the Employment Counseling Service.
On the referral form, which required the parole officer to indicate the parolee's adult
criminal record, the officer indicated that Whalen had been convicted of robbery but failed
to note the attempted rape conviction.
73. Id. at 466.
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Approving of the distinction between discretionary and minis-
terial acts, the Rieser court quickly determined that the activities
in question were performed on the ministerial level, and that
therefore the suit was not barred by sovereign immunity:
Whatever the problems of linedrawing potentially raised by [the discretion-
ary-ministerial distinction], we conclude that [the parole officer's] acts in the
present case were "ministerial." [He] was not involved in the formulation of
policy, but in the execution of policy as it affected an individual parolee. He
was under a clear duty. . . to disclose Whalen's full adult record.. .. [He]
was similarly under a duty to provide adequate supervision . . ..
In another recent case, Payton v. United States,7 5 a murder vic-
tim's family brought suit under the FTCA alleging that a federal
prisoner was released from custody in disregard of medical re-
ports evaluating him as a homicidal psychotic.7 6 In 1966, the pris-
oner, Thomas Whisenhant, an Air Force member, was sentenced
to twenty years in federal prison for assault with attempt to mur-
der a female member of the Air Force. The court noted that
while imprisoned for this crime, "Whisenhant manifested his con-
tinued homicidal tendencies" by threatening the only female he
had contact with, an employee of the penitentiary.77 Whisenhant
was diagnosed as phychotic and described as suffering from para-
noid schizophrenia.78 Nevertheless, his sentence was reduced by
one-half and he was paroled in 1973. Shortly after his release,
Whisenhant confessed to the brutal murder and mutilation of
three females.
7 9
In deciding whether or not the decision to release
Whisenhant was discretionary for purposes of section 2680(a), a
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit acknowledged
74. Id. at 475.
75. 6386 F.2d 132 (1981), rev'd in part on rehearing, 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982).
76. Id. at 134.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Within two years of his parole, Whisenhant beat and murdered a woman in
Mobile, Alabama. Five months later, he kidnapped and murdered another woman from
Mobile, returning the next day to mutilate the body. The court noted that there were nine
stab wounds just above the heart area, the abdomen was slashed open, the thighs were
slashed through the entire length, the throat was cut, the larynx was severed, the vagina
was cut by two lateral incisions-each six inches long, the labia was severed from the pubis,
and both breasts were fully amputated. Six months after this second attack, Whisenhant
kidnapped, raped and murdered appellants' wife/mother, returning to mutilate her body
in a manner similar to that described above. Id. at 134 n.2.
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the difficulties in applying the planning/operational distinction
and asserted that "we must look deeper into the purposes ex-
pressed by the FTCA to extract the sense of the matter and upon
this attempt to build a workable standard."80 The court concluded
that defining what is discretionary requires application of a bal-
ancing test which considers the nature of the loss imposed by the
government on the injured party,81 the nature and quality of the
governmental activity causing the injury,82 and the court's capac-
ity for deciding the case.83
80. Id. at 138. The court noted that "the crux of the concept embodied in the discre-
tionary function exemption is that of the separation of powers." Id. at 143. See also supra
note 48 and accompanying text.
81. The court noted that "[t]he more serious, in terms of physical or mental impair-
ment, and isolated the loss the closer the question becomes as to whether the individual can
be expected to absorb the loss as incident to an acceptable social or political risk of govern-
mental activities." Payton, 636 F.2d at 144.
82. The court, citing Dalehite, indicated that it must be "determine[d] if the allega-
tions attack the rules formulated by the agency or merely their application ...
[C]onsiderations. . .relevant at this juncture [are] whether this activity is one traditionally
or constitutionally exercised by a coordinate branch of government or one fraught with
political or policy overtones such as the feasibility or practicality of a program . . . ." Id.
83. The court further observed that it "should consider whether the vehicle of a tort
suit provides the relevant standard of care, be it professional or reasonableness, for the
evaluation of the governmental decision." Id. at 145.
While the court's balancing test seems to stray far from the the more traditional plan-
ning/operational test, the court later notes that
[i]t is important to note . . . that the allegations attack only the application
of the Parole Board's guidelines to Whisenhant and not the guidelines them-
selves. The exercise of policy-making discretion by the Board occurred in for-
mulating and implementing the guideline criteria and matrix .... Such "pol-
icy" decisions. . .are probably exempt under Dalehite. . .. [But], the choices
involved in applying the guidelines and releasing a particular person[,]
[w]hether characterized as "operational," "day-to-day" or by some other label,
• ..do not achieve the status of a basic policy evaluation and decision. Such
decisions, if negligent, are not protected by § 2680(a).
Id. at 146-47 (emphasis added).
This passage appears to reduce the impact of the balancing test described in the text.
While the balancing test purports to aid in determining what activity is discretionary, the
above passage suggests that this analysis applies only to activity which has traditionally been
designated as operational or ministerial, i.e., application as opposed to formulation of policy.
See text accompanying note 72. If taken literally, the Court of Appeals in Payton appears to
require a two-pronged test: First, a court would have to determine whether or not the
decision involved policy. Determination of this question would appear to require applica-
tion of the traditional planning/operational test along with its concomitant inadequacies. If
policy is involved, immunity results. If not, the second prong requires application of the
court's balancing test, which requires consideration of the nature of the loss imposed on
the injured party, the government's interest, and the court's capacity for deciding the case.
Surely the Court of Appeals did not wish to mandate this approach, which would only
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On appeal to the full court of appeals, the court reversed the
decision of the panel."" Ignoring the balancing test applied by the
panel, the full court looked no further than the statute governing
parole releases. That statute states in part that if there is a "rea-
sonable probability" that the prisoner will live and remain at lib-
erty without violating the laws, and if in the opinion of the Parole
Board the release "is not incompatible with the welfare of soci-
ety" then the Board may in its discretion authorize the prisoner's
release.8 5 The court rejected plaintiff's argument that since the
statute required a determination that the prisoner is a "good risk"
before it may, within its discretion, release him, this first determi-
nation is a non-discretionary one. Instead, the court held that:
The decision to release the prisoner on parole must necessarily entail an
evaluation by the parole board of the prisoner's records. Thus, the parole
board's final decision that the prisoner is worthy to live in society as a free
person is not different from the decision to release him on parole. The stat-
ute clearly describes this as a discretionary function. 8
3. Critique of federal cases. In struggling to devise a suitable
formula for analyzing cases in which the government alleges im-
munity, the federal courts have focused their attention on the dis-
tinction between planning activity as opposed to mere implemen-
tation of that planning. The result has been creation of the
planning/operational and discretionary/ministerial standards.
Criticism of these standards stems from three identifiable
problems inherent in these distinctions. First, as Justice Goldberg
indicated in Smith, difficult cases render application of this stan-
dard almost impossible.8 7 This situation was illustrated in Bairds8
and S.A. Empresa,s9 where the line between policy and its imple-
mentation becomes virtually imperceptible.9 0 In those cases, the
courts held for the government on the ground that any negli-
gence consisted in the plan or procedures, but not in the imple-
exacerbate the difficulty federal courts already experience in applying governmental immu-
nity. Nevertheless, the above passage demonstrates the Court of Appeals' concern with
straying too far from the problematic, albeit safe, haven of the planning/operational test.
84. Payton, 679 F.2d at 475.
85. Id. at 480 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4203(a)) (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 480.
87. See cases cited supra note 37.
88. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
90. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
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mentation of these procedures. But there is no distinction other
than in the level the negligent act occurred; in both cases the re-
sult is exactly the same. The courts' logic brings to mind the oft-
cited war crimes defense that "I was only carrying out orders,"
since, under this rationale, one will be protected for carrying out
orders according to the rules, regardless of the "orders"
themselves.
Secondly, characterizing a decision as policy or as the carry-
ing out of that policy lends itself to vast judicial discretion. Since
almost any decision can be made to look like policy, or, alterna-
tively, its implementation, judges can draw lines virtually where
they please. For instance, a sound argument could have been
made in Baird that the policy decision amounted only to the deci-
sion to publish the charts, while the implementation of that policy
consisted in the actual decisions as to which symbols and specifica-
tions were to be used in the charts. This type of arbitrary judicial
line-drawing would explain the trend away from Dalehite, as evi-
denced by Rayonier and Hunsucker, as plaintiff-oriented courts be-
gan to label activities formerly falling under the rubric discretion-
ary as operational.91
Finally, later courts have implicitly recognized that even when
policy and planning are involved, holding the government liable
for the activity in question often would not hinder the federal
government's ability to govern, as opposed for example, to a pol-
icy decision to subsidize farmers or to reinstate the draft.92 This
position was emphasized in Elgin and Spencer, which held that the
mere labelling of an activity as governmental is insufficient to trig-
ger sovereign immunity. Only when judicial interference would
thwart the government's ability to govern effectively does the ac-
tivity benefit from immunity. Alluding to the target practice hypo-
thetical discussed earlier,93 liability would be proper since judicial
"interference" in allowing a victim in that situation to recover
would make no statement on the propriety of encouraging
91. Presumably, if this line were pushed back far enough, the discretionary exception
would be effectively thwarted as only the actual plans or ideas themselves would amount to
policy. See Cerrone & Hardy supra note 22, at 1265.
92. To hold the government liable in the latter instance would "jeopardiz[e] the quali-
ty and efficiency of government itself." Elgin v. District of Columbia, 337 F.2d 152, 154
(D.C. Cir. 1964).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
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soldiers to target practice, although it does require the govern-
ment to safely conduct these exercises. The critical question that
must be asked is whether liability would threaten executive or leg-
islative independence or whether the activity in question instead
more closely resembles a common-law tort.
The federal release cases present a good illustration of the
inadequacy of the present standards for applying the discretionary
function exception and sovereign immunity in general. In both
Fair and Rieser, the courts had no difficulty in making the determi-
nation that the release decisions were non-discretionary. Search-
ing for something on which to base their opinion, the courts in
these cases focused on activity which they asserted represented the
execution rather than the formulation of policy."4 In Rieser, for
example, the court of appeals noted that liability was largely pred-
icated on "[the parole officer's] actions in filling out the referral
form, 5 and in determining precisely when and how to speak to
Whalen and his supervisors . "...96 The court, however, offered
no clues as to why the parole officer's decision concerning how to
"speak to" Whalen and his supervisors was not in fact any more
discretionary than in authorizing the release of a prisoner.
Moreover, cases like Rieser provide no guidelines for future
courts deciding similar cases. Although the facts of Payton were
similar to those of Rieser, the court in the former case ultimately
held that the government's activity was discretionary. Relying on
a statute which stated the parole board may in its discretion author-
ize the release of prisoners, 7 the court there held the release
therefore to be within the discretionary function exception. But,
as was noted in Smith, all decisionmaking involves discretion. 8
"Discretion" as the word is used in the statute appears to have no
relation to the "discretion" required for activity to fall within sec-
tion 2680(a). For activity to be discretionary as the word is used in
the latter sense, the courts usually have required the activity to
stem from policy or planning decisions. Following the logic of Pay-
ton, even ministerial acts which may or may not be performed by
government employees (i.e. it is within the employee's discretion
94. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 66-74.
95. See supra note 72.
96. Rieser, 563 F.2d at 475.
97. See supra text accompanying note 85.
98. See supra text accompanying note 37.
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to perform these acts) would fall under the rubric "discretionary."
The result of the confusion in discerning discretionary from
non-discretionary activity has forced courts into linguistic gymnas-
tics (such as that described above in Payton) or into scrutinizing
the facts of each case in search of some governmental activity
which appears to be ministerial in nature. In response to this
open-ended approach, plaintiffs have been forced to allege in
their complaint negligence at every stage of release, including im-
proper psychiatric treatment while an inmate,99 improper re-
lease,100 failure to put appropriate constraints on the release, 10 1
failure to revoke the release, 10 2 inadequate supervision of the re-
leased inmate,10 3 and failure to warn potential victims that the in-
mate has been released.104 The list is by no means exhaustive. Lia-
bility is frequently pinned on governmental action outside the
decision to release, since the release decision is often cloaked with
immunity directly granted in the statute.10 5 But relying on these
alternate routes to recovery masks the fact that often the decision
to release is negligently made.
Finally, as will be more fully discussed later, the release cases
fail to take account of the very purpose of immunity- mainte-
nance of the separation of powers. The prospect of releasing in-
mates clearly does not present questions of "such delicacy and dif-
ficulty" that the government's ability to furnish these services
(e.g., prisons and mental institutions) would be impaired by judi-
cially-imposed liability.10 6
99. See, e.g., Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982).
100. See, e.g., Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956).
101. See, e.g., Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1966) (claim
based on Air Force allowing disturbed airman to return to duty and have access to .45
caliber pistol).
102. See, e.g., Rieser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
103. See, e.g., Pate v. Alabama Board of Pardons & Paroles, 409 F. Supp 478 (N.D.
Ala.), affid, 548 F.2d 354 (5th Cir 1976). See also Rieser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d
462 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
104. See infra note 117.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 190-91.
106. See text accompanying note 54.
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B. The Federal Standard Revisited: Recent State Consideration
of Release Cases
In Cairl v. State,'"7 plaintiffs sued the state of Minnesota for
injuries and damage caused by Tom Connolly while visiting his
family on holiday leave from the Minnesota Learning Center at
Brainerd State Hospital. Connolly bordered on mental retardation
with an I.Q. of 57, and in 1976 at age 15 was declared a delin-
quent and placed in a foster home.108 During his stay there, he
was suspected of starting three fires. 109 Soon thereafter, in May
1977, Connolly ran away and was found at the scene of another
fire.110 Pursuant to an order of the Juvenile Court, he was placed
in an adolescent treatment unit, where his psychiatrist noted that
Connolly's propensity for fires "does remain a concern for the
next several years.""' In September of that year, he was admitted
to the Minnesota Learning Center, which is an open door facility
designed to provide treatment and education to retarded youths
with behavioral problems." 2 After being suspected of starting two
fires at the Center, his condition became slated for treatment.
Nevertheless, prior to the commencement of treatment, Connolly
was granted a temporary holiday pass to return to his mother's
apartment, consistent with the Center's goal of encouraging home
visits. 13 During the visit, Connolly set fire to a couch in the apart-
ment, killing his sister and destroying the apartment.
1 4
Plaintiffs" 5 sued the state"" alleging negligence in releasing
Connolly in light of the state's awareness of Connolly's dangerous
107. 323 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 1982).
108. Id. at 21.
109. The court stated that "[a]lthough [Connolly] was never adjudicated as having
been responsible, there is little doubt but that he was involved." Id. at 22.
110. Id. at 22. Arson charges were brought but eventually dismissed for lack of
evidence.
111. Id.
112. Id. The court noted that "the Center is committed to treating its students by the
least restrictive means and encourages home visits." Id. For a fuller discussion on "open
door" facilities, see Note, supra note 4.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. The two plaintiffs were Mrs. Connolly and the landlord of the destroyed
building.
116. Plaintiffs also sued the County of Ramsay Welfare Department and certain state
and city employees. This Comment will only focus on the potential liability of the state.
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tendencies towards setting fires. 1 The Minnesota Supreme
Court, in denying recovery, first declared that the decision to re-
lease Connolly was protected by the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity, which is triggered when an official of the state acts within his
discretionary capacity in performing his duties." 8 After noting
that the plaintiffs' claim for relief focused on the decision to re-
lease, and not the negligent implementation of that decision,"'
the court stated that the decision to release "involves the balanc-
ing of complex and competing factors comprising 'a discretionary
choice between alternatives'. . . . Moreover, the decision is an im-
117. As a second cause of action, plaintiffs asserted that the state was negligent in
failing to warn them of the danger Connolly presented. The court, noting this was a case
of first impression in Minnesota, looked to California law. The case relied on was Thomp-
son v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal.3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980). There,
a juvenile offender with "latent, extremely dangerous and violent propensities regarding
young children" had expressed an intention to kill one of the neighborhood children if he
was released, not specifying anyone in particular. Within 24 hours of his furlough he killed
a small boy. Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's
claim on the theory that the decedent was not a specifically identifiable victim. Though the
killer had expressed an intention to do so, these threats were "nonspecific threats of harm
directed at nonspecific victims." Id. at 754, 614 P.2d at 735, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 77 (emphasis
original).
In denying any liability for the state in Cairl, the Supreme Court of Minnesota focused
on Thompson, and, consequently, held that
if a duty to warn exists, it does so only when specific threats are made against
specific victims. . . . Tom Connolly did not pose a danger to plaintiffs different
from the danger he posed to any member of the public with whom he might be
in contact when seized with the urge to start a fire.
323 N.W.2d at 26. For further discussion of Thompson, see generally Note, Thompson v.
County of Alameda: Tort Plaintiffs' Paradise Lost?, 76 Nw. U.L. Rev. 331 (1981); Note,
Thompson v. County of Alameda: The Demise of The Special Relationship Doctrine in Califor-
nia, 15 U.S.F.L. Rev. 563 (1981).
118. Cairl, 323 N.W.2d at 23-24.
119. Id. at 23 n.1. This distinction may be illustrated by the following example: As-
sume the government decides to fly a dangerous radioactive cargo across country on a
certain day even though the weather conditions are such that a prudent individual would
not take the risk. It then proceeds to hire a pilot with a history of alcoholism and who has
been known to drink prior to flying. Assume further that the plane crashes because the
pilot, in a state of inebriation, is unable to control it, and people on the ground are injured
by the fallout. Presumably, the Minnesota court would hold that the decision to go ahead
with the flight, despite the inclement weather conditions, is a discretionary one and thus
immune from attack, while the implementation of that decision, in hiring an incompetent
pilot, does not benefit from the same protection. This distinction is not nearly always so
clear. For example, how would the court rule if, in the example cited above, the govern-
ment adhered to a policy of hiring alcoholic pilots? Could it be argued that the state would
be immune from suit notwithstanding this policy because it represents a judgment of dis-
cretion? See supra text accompanying notes 38-47.
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portant element in planning Tom Connolly's overall treatment
program and is thus indicative of 'decision-making on the planning
level of conduct. "'120
Similarly, in Sherrill v. Wilson,' 2a the Missouri Supreme Court
came to the same result as the Minnesota Supreme Court in Cairl.
In Sherrill, Gregory Corley, who had been involuntarily commit-
ted to a state mental hospital, was released on a two day pass. Cor-
ley did not return from his leave, and shortly thereafter shot
plaintiff's son in the head eleven times. The court disposed of the
claims against the state in merely one sentence, noting that the
state is protected from liability by the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity.' 22 Nevertheless, in deciding that recovery against hospital su-
pervisors and physicians must similarly be denied, the court noted
that:
Analogies abound. Judges are immune from civil liability for damages.
The reason . . . is one of policy. Every obstacle to a judicial officer's de-
tached and unemcumbered judgment must be removed. There must be pro-
tection not only against what might be proved but against what might be
claimed. Decisions about temporary or permanent release of involuntary de-
tainees should be likewise unencumbered and unfettered, at least as against
negligence claims.
123
Not all states have come to the same result. In Smith v. Dep't of
Corrections,24 the District Court of Appeals of Florida held that
sovereign immunity is not applicable where a corrections depart-
ment employee causes a prisoner to be reclassified to a minimum
custody status. In 1973 the prisoner, Prince, was convicted of first
degree murder. In 1974, Prince was classified as a minimum cus-
tody inmate and transferred to a vocational center. He escaped on
the day of the transfer, and was recaptured shortly thereafter suf-
fering from unexplained gunshot wounds.'25 In 1976 Prince was
nevertheless reclassified to minimum custody status. In 1978 he
again escaped, and in the course of an armed robbery shot plain-
tiff. The court, applying the planning/operational distinction, 28
held that the discretion exercised by prison officials was on an op-
120. Id. at 23-24 (emphasis added).
121. 653 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
122. Id. at 669.
123. Id. at 665.
124. 432 So.2d 1338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
125. Id. at 1339.
126. Id. at 1340.
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erational rather than a planning level, and concluded that there is
no sovereign immunity when an inmate is negligently given pref-
erential treatment and placed in inadequately supervised
confinement.127
The state cases present two points of concern. First, with the
exception of Smith (which appears to be in the minority) the trend
of recent cases is to follow the federal scheme of distinguishing
discretionary from ministerial or operational activity, and to deny
recovery on the theory that decisions made by parole board mem-
bers or hospital supervisors are discretionary and consequently
immune from suit.
Perhaps more importantly, these cases demonstrate the sim-
plistic analysis used in applying the federal test. In Sherrill, for ex-
ample, the court wastes only one sentence in asserting that sover-
eign immunity applies."'R There is no discussion as to why Corley
was allowed the leave of absence in light of his history of violent
crimes and mental illness, whether those who authorized the re-
lease knew of Corley's propensities or the extent of his illness, or
how he behaved on previous leaves of absence. These questions
are obscured in the court's search for some "discretion" in the
decisionmaking process, which, if found, suffices to quash action
against the state regardless of how incompetent the decision to
release may have been.
Focusing merely on the "discretion" of administrators rather
than the circumstances of the release appears even more absurd
when it becomes clear that the distinction between discretionary
and ministerial is without meaning, as was demonstrated by the
difficulty of the federal courts in applying that standard. These
cases show that the court can easily find an action to be either
within or without an administrator's discretion. The holding in
Smith, for example, is entirely at odds with that in Cairl and Sher-
rill. How can there be any more or less discretion involved in
making a decision to release an inmate on temporary furlough
than in a decision to reclassify an inmate to minimum custody
status?
127. Id.
128. See supra text accompanying note 122.
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II. THE NEW YORK PERSPECTIVE
Similar to the Federal Tort Claims Act, New York has
adopted the Court of Claims Act section 8, which reads:
The State hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby
assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance
with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against
individuals or corporations 129
Omitted from this Act is a section analogous to section
2680(a) (the discretionary function exception) in the federal act.
This omission has led one commentator to observe that New York
has waived sovereign immunity more completely than any other
jurisdiction, including the federal government.130
Despite such apparently broad waiver, in Weiss v. Fote,"31 the
seminal case regarding sovereign immunity in New York, plain-
tiffs nevertheless were denied recovery on the grounds that the
alleged negligence resulted from a discretionary act of public offi-
cials. The plaintiff in that case was injured while driving through
an intersection which had an insufficient "clearance interval" be-
tween the light turning red in one lane and green in the oncom-
ing lane.132 The clearance interval was established by a Board of
Safety which made extensive studies of traffic conditions. a3 The
court held that "courts should not be permitted to review deter-
minations of governmental planning bodies under the guise of al-
lowing them to be challenged in negligence suits.
'134
Ostensibly, then, New York appeared to adopt the federal
distinction of planning versus operational levels of government.
But at the conclusion of the Weiss opinion the court seemed to
retreat from this position by noting that "[liability . . . may only
be predicated on proof that the plan either was evolved without ade-
129. N.Y. COURT OF CLAiMs ACT § 8 (Mckinney 1963).
130. Herzog, Liability of the State of New York for "Purely Governmental" Functions, 10
SYRACUSE L. REV. 30 (1958) (survey of what types of activity fall within the rubric "govern-
mental"). For a comparison of the development of the doctrine of governmental immunity
in New York as compared to the United States, see Sherry, The Myth that the King Can Do
No Wrong: A Comparative Study of the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine in the United States and New
York Court of Claims, 22 AD. L. REV. 597 (1970).
131. 7 N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960).
132. Id. at 583, 167 N.E.2d at 64, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 588, 167 N.E.2d at 67, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
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quate study or lacked reasonable basis."'1 35 This qualification is per-
plexing and appears facially inconsistent with the court's refusal to
review governmental determinations of policy. If this statement is
taken literally, it is unclear what types of decisions remain pro-
tected. The court's caveat on the immunity rule smacks of tradi-
tional tort notions, and foreshadows future courts' willingness to
curtail the immunity doctrine when traditional elements of negli-
gence have been satisfied.13
A. The Aftermath of Weiss-Bifurcation of a Doctrine
1. Sovereign immunity in New York before and after Weiss. It has
been held that section 8 of the Court of Claims Act has not served
to abolish all types of immunity in New York. Judicial immunity,
for example, has remained a firmly rooted bar to recovery when
the judge is acting within the performance of his official duties.
13
7
Similarly, New York courts have held that section 8 does not ap-
ply to decisions which are "governmental" in nature.1 38 In Barrett
v. State, 39 decided in 1917, plaintiff, a landowner, sued the state
for damages incurred by a legislative act prohibiting the hunting
of beaver and appropriating money for the purchase and restock-
ing of beaver.140 Claimants owned land adjacent to the restocked
area, and suffered financial loss when beavers, which are by na-
ture destructive of certain types of trees, felled hundreds of pop-
lar trees on plaintiff's land. The Court of Appeals denied the
claim on the grounds that the legislature, in protecting the bea-
ver, was exercising a governmental function for which it could not
be held accountable:
Wherever protection [of wildlife] is accorded harm may be done to the indi-
vidual. . . . In certain cases the legislature may be mistaken in its belief that
more good than harm is occasioned. But this is clearly a matter which is
confided to its discretion. It exercises a governmental function for the bene-
135. Id. at 589, 167 N.E.2d at 68, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 416 (emphasis added).
136. See infra text accompanying notes 150-73.
137. See Ford v. State, 21 A.D.2d 437, 250 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dep't 1964); Smith v.
State, 26 A.D.2d 974, 274 N.Y.S.2d 738 (3d Dep't 1966); Murph v. State, 98 Misc. 2d 324,
413 N.Y.S.2d 854 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
138. See Herzog, supra note 130.
139. 220 N.Y. 423, 116 N.E. 99 (1917).
140. The court noted that by the year 1900, the beaver was practically exterminated
in New York. It was for this reason the protective legislation was passed. Id. at 425, 116
N.E. at 100.
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fit of the public at large and no one can complain of the incidental injuries
that may result.
141
In later cases, the realm of "governmental" functions was ex-
panded. In one case,'42 the Third Department, relying on Barrett,
held that injuries sustained in a car accident with a New York
Guardsman were not actionable against the state on the grounds
that legislative dispositions of policy are not a proper subject for
suits against the government.
Some New York courts have looked to Weiss as confirmation
of this expanded interpretation. In Bellows v. State,143 for example,
plaintiff claimed that his extended stint in prison resulted from a
failure of the state to provide him with a sufficient amount of
medical and psychiatric attention and treatment. Although noting
that decisions concerning the frequency and amount of psychiatric
care to furnish prisoners are administrative in nature, the court,
citing Weiss, nevertheless rejected plaintiff's claim on the ground
that these types of governmental decisions are sovereign in char-
acter. In determining whether or not an activity is governmental,
other New York courts have looked to the familiar discretionary/
ministerial distinction14 4 and have immunized governmental activ-
ity which involves discretion or planning.
2. Sidestepping the problem of immunity-the separation of powers
notion and emergence of a tort standard of care. While cases citing
Weiss to support the proposition that activity by the state of a gov-
ernmental nature will be immune from review have the effect of
precluding liability irrespective of negligence in the decisionmak-
ing,a4 5 other cases have posited a less restrictive interpretation of
141. Id at 427, 116 N.E. at 100.
142. Newiadony v. State, 276 A.D. 59, 93 N.Y.S.2d 24 (3d Dep't 1949).
143. 37 A.D.2d 342, 325 N.Y.S.2d 225 (4th Dep't 1971).
144. See, e.g., Rottkamp v. Young, 21 A.D.2d 373, 375, 249 N.Y.S.2d 330, 333 (2d
Dep't 1964), affd, 15 N.Y.2d 831, 205 N.E.2d 866, 257 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1965) (discretion-
ary/ministerial test applied); Hudleasco, Inc. v. State, 90 Misc. 2d 1057, 396 N.Y.S.2d
1002 (Ct. Cl. 1977), afd, 63 A.D.2d 1042, 405 N.Y.S.2d 784 (3d Dep't 1978) (State's
negligence arose out of ministerial error, not discretionary act); Crisafulli v. State, 37
A.D.2d 688, 323 N.Y.S.2d 320 (4th Dep't 1971) (Conservation Department has discretion-
ary power to order removal of beaver dams, but once removal is ordered failure to so
remove the dams is a ministerial act); Southworth v. State, 62 A.D.2d 731, 740, 405
N.Y.S.2d 548, 553 (4th Dep't 1978), affd, 47 N.Y.2d 874, 392 N.E.2d 1254, 419 N.Y.S.2d
71 (1979) ("State has retained its immunity in areas involving the exercise of expert judg-
ment in the course of governmental planning for the public safety").
145. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
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Weiss. In Niagara Frontier Transit System v. State,146 plaintiff sued
the state for indemnification of payments made to a woman in-
jured by one of plaintiff's buses. Plaintiff's claim asserted that the
state's decision to locate the bus terminal where the injury oc-
curred was negligently made and was the cause of this injury.1 47
Although liability was denied, the court cited the Weiss caveat and
held that "where it can be shown that a duly executed highway
plan 'either was evolved without adequate study or lacked reason-
able basis,' liability may attach where injury arises out of the oper-
ation of such a plan.' 4 8
Although Niagara Frontier appears consistent with Weiss, it is
hard to reconcile this case with those that cite Weiss to support an
analysis based on the planning/operational or the discretionary/
ministerial distinctions. In the latter cases, judicial inquiry ends
upon the determination that the decision in question was policy-
oriented; in Niagara Frontier, however, the state must hurdle a sec-
ond inquiry: namely, was that decision properly made (i.e. was
there adequate study and reasonable basis for the decision)? While
this second inquiry might not mandate recovery even upon a
showing of negligence,149 it does signal a shift away from complete
immunity and towards a more qualified immunity.
Other cases have interpreted Weiss as conflicting even more
directly with the doctrine of immunity. In Poysa v. State,50 the
plaintiffs sought damages for injuries resulting from the state's
negligent design and reconstruction of a highway. According to
design plans, light stone was to be placed on top of bedrock to
form the shoulder of the highway.' 5 ' Although the state was ad-
vised by the general contractor that this would not hold, the
warning was ignored .'5  After a heavy rain the shoulder eroded
and plaintiffs' property was inundated with water and debris.15
146. 57 A.D.2d 59, 394 N.Y.S.2d 930 (4th Dep't 1977).
147. Id. at 61-62, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 931.
148. Id.
149. While the requirement of adequate study seems to imply that decisions based on
all the facts will be protected even if incorrectly made, the second requirement of reasona-
ble basis appears to mandate merely that the decision not be unreasonable from an objec-
tive standpoint.
150. 102 Misc. 2d 269, 423 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
151. Id. at 270, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 618.
152. Id. at 270, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
153. Id. at 271, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
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The state argued that liability was barred under Weiss.' In
rejecting this argument, and allowing recovery for plaintiff, the
court noted that:
The holding in Weiss. . . has generated some confusion. Although the deci-
sion appeared to be premised on the doctrine of governmental immunity,
the court added the caveat that liability could be found where it is demon-
strated that a duly executed highway design plan was evolved without ade-
quate study or lacked a reasonable basis. Thus, in a practical sense, the standard
enunciated was no different than the reasonable man standard applied to profes-
sional malpractice in the private sector.'55
Similarly, in Drake v. State'56 plaintiff sued for injuries result-
ing from gunshot wounds sustained while driving through a camp-
site occupied by a group of Mohawk Indians calling themselves
the "Warrior Society." The Indians had earlier taken over the
campsite by force and claimed possession in what appeared to be
an act of war.15 7 Armed patrols were maintained and trespassers
were physically ousted.'58 Gunfire ensued on at least one occa-
sion. 59 Although the state was aware of these incidents, little ac-
tion was taken.160 Plaintiff,""' a nine-year-old girl being driven
through the campsite by her parents (who were unaware of the
takeover) was shot twice in the back, one bullet lodging in her
heart.
62
The court noted the general rule that "the State, acting in its
governmental capacity, cannot be cast in damages for its failure to
furnish police protection to a particular individual.' 6 3 The court
154. Id.
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. 97 Misc. 2d 1015, 416 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
157. The court noted that "[b]unkers and foxholes were placed at various locations to
the west of the road. Armed patrols were maintained throughout the site .... [T]he occu-
pied lands resembled an armed encampment." Id. at 1017, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
158. Id. at 1017-18, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
159. Id. at 1018, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 736-37.
160. The court noted that the state "merely stepped up patrols on the roadway, inves-
tigated complaints without entering the campsite and gathered information from individu-
als in the area." Id. at 1018, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
161. There were two plaintiffs in this action. Only the girl recovered, since the court
found the other plaintiff contributorily negligent in provoking an attack.
162. Id. at 1023, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 740.
163. Id. at 1019, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 737. The court further noted that "[t]he general
rule does not apply where there is owed a special duty to the claimant. This duty may be
created where the status of the claimant gives rise to a special relationship. Thus, a special
duty is owed to informers, undercover agents, persons under court orders of protection,
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nevertheless held for plaintiff on the ground that the state
breached its duty as a landowner to exercise reasonable care to
abate a known dangerous condition existing on its land.6 This
result was obtained in spite of the fact that the decision not to
eject or otherwise neutralize the threat was a policy decision,' 5
and that the state's failure to provide police protection is not
actionable.166
Poysa and Drake demonstrate the New York courts' willing-
ness to substantially curtail the scope of the immunity doctrine. In
Poysa, the court stresses the fact that a principle which underlies
governmental immunity is protection of the integrity of the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine.16 7 It was stated that:
The . . .predicate of immunity, separation of powers, is premised on
the notion that the courts may not intrude into the policy-making decisions
of co-ordinate branches of government. Thus, it has consistently been held
that there is no liability for a breach of the executive or legislative duty to
govern, which is owed only to the general public.
With respect to highway design, certain decisions, such as those related
to a public improvement's necessity ... involve duties owed only to the gen-
eral public. The implementation of an unsafe design, however, may impinge
upon the recognized tort rights of an individual or definable class. Liability
in such a case is ... [predicated] upon the violation of the recognized tort
duty. . . . The court in Weiss v. Fote . . .recognized this distinction as well,
when it backed away from absolute immunity and applied the reasonable
man standard of professional malpractice to a case where there existed an
underlying duty to keep a street or highway in a reasonably safe condition.
Simply stated, if the duty violated is one owed only to the general pub-
lic, there is no remedy in law and the act or decision is immune from review.
If, however, a duty arises from the existence of a special relationship, or
if an act or decision violates a pre-existing right of a person or definable
class of persons, which right is recognized by the law of torts, then liability
may be adjudged by the application of general tort principles. 108
Rejecting the planning/operational classification, the Poysa
and school children where a municipality has assumed a responsibility of providing crossing
guards." Id. at 1019, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 737-38 (citations omitted). The Drake court, how-
ever, held there was no special relationship created which obligated the state to provide
police protection in that case. Id. at 1020, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
164. Id. at 1020-21, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
165. Id. at 1022, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 740.
166. Id. at 1020, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
167. Poysa, 102 Misc. 2d at 273, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
168. Id. at 273-74, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 620-21 (citations omitted).
RELEASE OF DANGEROUS INMATES
court instead focuses on the nature of the duty owed to the pub-
lic; 16 9 if an act or decision is found to violate an individual's "pre-
existing right," then liability is judged by the application of gen-
eral tort principles.
17 0
Drake similarly dilutes the immunity doctrine by allowing re-
covery if a separate duty owed a plaintiff is breached, even if the
activity would otherwise be outside the bounds of judicial re-
view. 1 1 While that court reiterated the notion that failure to pro-
vide police protection could not result in governmental liability, it
allowed plaintiff to bypass that doctrine by relying on common-law
notions of duty owed by property owners.7 2 But this analysis flies
in the face of the legal tenet that "[w]here [immunity] applies, [it]
is absolute, no matter how wrongful or injurious the act, and re-
gardless of the breach of an otherwise recognized tort duty."1 73
Further restrictions on the immunity doctrine occurred in a
case arising out of the Attica riots. In Jones v. State,14 action was
brought against the state for the death of a correctional facility
accounts clerk who was taken hostage during the riot, and who
later died from state police gunfire during the retaking of the
prison. The lower court, in denying recovery, relied on Weiss for
the proposition that the decision to retake the prison necessitated
the exercise of judgment in the course of governmental planning
and was clearly sovereign in nature. 7 5 Although the Court of Ap-
peals rejected reliance on Weiss on the ground that the claim at
hand sounded in intentional tort rather than negligence,'17 6 it fur-
ther noted that "[t]he action of retaking the prison is no more
'governmental' than making an arrest, maintaining someone in
custody or investigating a traffic infraction.' 77
Jones stands for the proposition that merely because an action
is performed by government officials or involves planning does
169. Id.
170. Id. at 274, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
171. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
172. See Drake, 97 Misc. 2d at 1019-21, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 737-39.
173. Poysa, 102 Misc. 2d at 272, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
174. 33 N.Y.2d 275, 307 N.E.2d 236, 352 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1973).
175. Jones v. State, 40 A.D.2d 227, 229, 338 N.Y.S.2d 738, 740-41 (4th Dep't 1972).
176. In Kelly v. State, 57 A.D.2d 320, 329, 395 N.Y.S.2d 311, 318 (4th Dep't 1977),
the court noted that dismissal of the negligence cause of action in Jones was not on the
grounds that there is no cause of action for negligence in governmental planning, but was
instead dismissed on the grounds that Worker's Compensation was the exclusive remedy.
177. Jones, 33 N.Y.2d at 280, 307 N.E.2d at 238, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
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not mean that the action itself must be deemed governmental.
The Court of Appeals has embraced the modern tendency against
the rule of nonliability'718 by recognizing the distinction between
the actions of government agents and the sovereign actions of a
legislative body.
It is clear that New York has refused to apply a strict immu-
nity analysis. New York courts have attempted to find a middle
ground between restricting governmental decisionmaking by im-
posing potential liability for all policy decisions made by govern-
ment, and precluding recovery by victims of governmental
negligence.
The New York approach has thus been twofold. First, rather
than focusing on whether the decision was policy-oriented, the
trend in this state has been to find exempt from liability only
those decisions which are purely "governmental" in na-
ture179-that is, those decisions which by allowing a plaintiff to
recover would threaten the state's ability to govern. 180 A decision
is not governmental merely because it is made by a government
official, or because it involves policy or planning.""' Decisions are
immune from liability only when the duty owed is to the general
public, as opposed to specific individuals. This would presumably
cover decisions concerning matters such as budgetary questions
and taxation. Thus, if the state legislature decides to cut back on
its aid to the poor, those detrimentally affected by the legislation
presumably would not have a cause of action against the state. Re-
ferring to the hypothetical discussed earlier,18 2 however, it ap-
pears that since there the decision to take target practice in the
park breaches the government's duty of care to specific individu-
als (park patrons), injured persons would appear to have a cause
of action against the state. The distinction here is that govern-
178. See Augustine v. Town of Brant, 249 N.Y. 198, 163 N.E. 732 (1928).
179. Even if the activity in question is purely governmental, liability might still ensue
if the plaintiff can show that a separate duty of care owed to him or her was breached. This
duty has been found in a special relationship to the plaintiff, see Florence v. Goldberg, 44
N.Y.2d 189, 375 N.E.2d 763, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1978); Schuster v. City of New York, 5
N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958), and when the state acts in a propri-
etary capacity. See Drake, 97 Misc. 2d 1015, 416 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Ct. Cl. 1979), affd, 75
A.D.2d 1016, 432 N.Y.S.2d 676 (4th Dep't 1980).
180. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 174-78.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
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ment could easily have designated a safer area to target practice
without hampering the government's ability to govern (i.e. to
choose to encourage soldiers to target practice); allowing recovery
to persons injured by budgetary legislation, however, would create
an impossible obstacle to legislators.
This analysis acknowledges that the purpose of immunity is
not so much to protect the government from liability, as to ensure
the uninhibited separation of powers.18 3 In essence, New York
courts have looked to the nature of the activity in question, rather
than the level of government on which the decision is made. Re-
jecting the simplistic tests applied by the federal courts, the trend
of courts in this state has been to focus on the duty owed to claim-
ants. Is the duty owed merely a general duty to govern, or are
rights of specific individuals involved?1
4
Secondly, even where immunity applies, the courts have been
unwilling to allow for more than a qualified immunity whereby
decisions of governmental officials are reviewed for adequate
study and reasonable basis. Thus, as was the case in Niagara Fron-
tier, even policy or planning decisions can trigger liability if in fact
these decisions were improperly made. Implicit in these decisions
is the recognition that the Weiss caveat has swallowed the general
rule preceeding it. The notion of immunity is inconsistent with
the application of tort doctrine to the same action. 8
183. Poysa, 102 Misc. 2d at 273, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 620. See also Jones, 33 N.Y.2d at 285-
86, 307 N.E.2d at 241, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 176-78 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
184. An example is in order. Assume the state legislature must decide whether to hold
the state olympic games in county X or county Y. While the facilities of county X are far
superior, and it would be less costly to hold the games in that county, the decision never-
theless is to have the games in county Y for the bizarre reason that county Y has a large
candy factory and it is believed that "the smell of candy in the air will stimulate the athletes
to perform at their best." In this instance, presumably the state would be immune from
suit brought by county X even though the state's logic for having the games in county Y
was faulty and/or ridiculous. Nevertheless, it is the legislature's choice to pick which
county it feels is best, and the judicial branch cannot override or inhibit the legislative
branch by holding the state-liable for a "wrong" decision.
Assume, however, that county Y was chosen because the majority of the legislators own
businesses in that county and are aware of the potential financial gain to their businesses of
having the games in county Y. Here, there should be no immunity, since holding the state
liable would not hinder the legislature's ability to govern, but would merely deter them
from governing corruptly.
185. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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B. The Release Cases
In Taylor v. State,18 a woman was murdered by a parolee who
was alleged to be a "prior sexual offender, a dangerous, irrespon-
sible, violent, homicidal, perverted individual. 11 7 On appeal from
the lower court's refusal to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
Appellate Division took these allegations to be true.188 Neverthe-
less, recovery was denied. The court held that:
[T]he State is not responsible for the Parole Board's release of Sickler predi-
cated as it presumably was on the professional judgment of a qualified and
competent physician. . . . Where there is any substantial support in the rec-
ord for the Parole Board's action, we cannot substitute our evaluation as to
whether there is a reasonable probability of a safe return to society for the
Board's "opinion" even if we deem the board's "opinion" to be
unreasonable.189
In making its decision, the court relied on New York Correc-
tion Law § 212,190 which mandated that "[a]ny action by the
board pursuant to this article shall be deemed a judicial function
and shall not be reviewable if done according to law.""" Never-
theless, while the state argued that pursuant to this statute the pa-
role board is deemed a quasi-judicial body and thus entitled to full
immunity, 192 the court, by requiring the decision to be based on
substantial support, instead applied the qualified immunity test of
Niagara Frontier.93
This analysis has similarly been applied to the area of release
186. 36 A.D.2d 878, 320 N.Y.S.2d 343 (3d Dep't 1971).
187. Id. at 878, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 344.
188. Id. at 878, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 344-45.
189. Id. at 878-79, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
190. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 212 was repealed in 1970. 1970 N.Y. Laws c.476 § 42. The
language relied on by the Taylor court is now incorporated in N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 259-i(5)
(McKinney 1982), which states: "Any action by the board pursuant to this article shall be
deemed a judicial function and shall not be reviewable if done in accordance with law,"
191. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 259-i(5)(McKinney 1982). The guidelines for making the
parole decision are listed in § 259-i(2)(c) of that statute and include
(i) the institutional record including program goals and accomplishments, ac-
ademic achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, ther-
apy and interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) performance, if
any, as a participant in a temporary release program; (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate . ...
192. See Brief for Appellant at 10-11.
193. See also Welch v. State, 74 A.D.2d 661, 424 N.Y.S.2d 774 (3d Dep't 1980).
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of state mental hospital patients. Thus, in Orman v. State,9 where
plaintiff was shot in the back by a patient on home visit from a
state hospital, it was held that in spite of an earlier diagnosis that
the patient suffered from catatonic schizophrenia, the state was
not responsible for an error in professional judgment, barring un-
reasonable basis for the decision to release.
195
The court's reluctance to afford the state total immunity rep-
resents a compromise approach, and demonstrates a judicial rec-
ognition that parole boards and "competent physicians" act in a
quasi-judicial fashion when determining whether an individual
should be released. A hearing board, much like a judge who sets
low bail or suspends a sentence, must take a "calculated risk"'19
by weighing the interests of the individual against those of society.
As one court noted, "[i]f a liability were imposed on the physician
or the State each time the prediction of future course of mental
disease was wrong, few releases would ever be made and the hope
of recovery and rehabilitation . . . would be impeded and
frustrated.
' 1 97
Notwithstanding the recognition of the judicial nature of pa-
role and patient discharge tribunals, the courts' reluctance to
grant full immunity indicates a similar awareness that often, per-
haps due to the informal nature of these hearings, 98 decisions to
release are hastily or improperly made. When this occurs, the re-
194. 37 A.D.2d 674, 322 N.Y.S.2d 914 (3d Dep't), appeal denied, 29 N.Y.2d 488, 328
N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1972).
195. Id. at 674-75, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 916-17. See also Taig v. State, 19 A.D.2d 182, 241
N.Y.S.2d 495 (3d Dep't 1963); St. George v. State, 283 A.D. 245, 127 N.Y.S.2d 147, afl'd,
308 N.Y. 681, 124 N.E.2d 320 (1954); Milano v. State, 44 Misc. 2d 290, 253 N.Y.S.2d 662
(Ct. CI. 1964); Timmins v. State, 58 Misc. 2d 626, 296 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
196. See Taig, 19 A.D.2d at 183, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
197. Id. at 183, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 496-97.
198. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.15(a) (McKinney 1978) stipulates that "[A] patient
may be discharged or conditionally released to the community by the director of a depart-
ment facility, if, in the opinion of staff familiar with the patient's case history, such patient
does not require active in-patient care and treatment."
Similarly, N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 259-i(2)(c)(McKinney 1982), governing parole, states that
[i]n making the parole release decision. . . the following [shall] be considered:
(i) the institutional record including program goals and accomplishments, aca-
demic achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, ther-
apy and interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) performance, if
any, as a participant in a temporary release program; (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate ..
See also infra note 217.
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leasing body loses its status as a quasi-judicial forum, and injured
third parties will be allowed to recover. In Homere v. State,190 for
example, two women were assaulted by a state hospital releasee.
Although the patient was initially judged suitable for release, dur-
ing the 41-days delay prior to his release, the patient showed signs
of violent and uncontrollable behavior. 00 He was nevertheless re-
leased minutes before he injured plaintiffs.20 1 The court held that
although no liability would attach if the release had been imple-
mented immediately subsequent to the commission's order to dis-
charge, the patient's deterioration in attitude mandated further
medical inquiry into his psychological fitness.0 2 The court noted
that by failing to do so, the ultimate release thus amounted to a
"purely administrative decision.120
Relying on the semantic distinction that the decision to re-
lease was administrative rather than medical, the court in Homere
seems to underscore a concern that decisions of this type will be
rendered immune regardless of the circumstances surrounding
the release. By characterizing the release decision as an adminis-
trative act, the Homere court recognized that the procedures used
in assessing the patient's fitness204 were so lacking that the deci-
sion to release could not be said to have been made quasi-judi-
cially. 205 Moreover, the court strips the state of any vestige of im-
munity, and instead applies a test of foreseeability. 20 6 The
distinction here is critical: Presumably, if a reevaluation by the ini-
tial commission were made of the patient after he displayed signs
of violence, affirming an earlier decision to release would not have
been actionable, since this decision would have been made by
competent physicians and thus requires only a reasonable basis.20 7
199. 48 A.D.2d 422, 370 N.Y.S.2d 246 (3d Dep't 1975).
200. Id. at 424, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
201. See Homere v. State, 79 Misc.2d 972, 973, 361 N.Y.S.2d 820, 821 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
202. Homere, 48 A.D.2d at 424, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
203. Id. at 424, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
204. More accurately, the court does not assail the procedures used, but those omitted
in not reevaluating the patient after his violent outbursts. Id. at 424, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
205. See also Payton, 636 F.2d at 146, where the court noted that "[t]he present admin-
istration of the parole system . . . is carried on in a somewhat ministerial fashion at a low
level within the agency. The process requires the hearing examiner to review the records,
add up pre-identified salient characteristics of the offender and to compare this to a largely
predetermined offense severity rating."
206. Homere, 48 A.D.2d at 424, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 248-49.
207. See supra notes 186-95 and accompanying text. That a decision is supported by a
528 [Vol. 33
1984] RELEASE OF DANGEROUS INMATES 529
By deeming the decision to release as an administrative act, how-
ever, injury need only have been foreseeable. Applying traditional
tort standards precludes state employees from taking a "calculated
risk" with impunity. 08
While Homere represents an exceptional case in the area of
mental patient releases, a recent Court of Claims case involving
furloughs for juvenile deliquents20 9 has gone even one step fur-
ther. Robilotto v. State210 involved a "vicious" assault on the plain-
tiff by a juvenile delinquent who was released on temporary fur-
lough from a State Division for Youth facility. The statute
authorizing release noted merely that "[t]he division [for youth]
may release . . any child . . whenever it deems such release -to
be in the best interest of the child. . . and that there is a reasona-
ble probability that the child can be released without endangering
the public safety."2 x The court noted that the assault was particu-
larly heinous, "involving not only the punching and stabbing of
the then 58 year old claimant, but also multiple rape and threats
to kill, all over a two hour period. ' 212 Claimant sued on the
grounds that the youth, who had a well documented history of
"reasonable basis" does not mean it is not negligently made. A reading of the Taylor seg-
ment quoted (see text accompanying note 170) indicates that the decision may both have
reasonable basis and yet be an unreasonable decision. Thus, the term "reasonable basis" as
used by the court cannot be equated with the "reasonable man" standard applied in tort
law.
208. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
209. The statute governing the release of youths from state facilities is similar to the
statute governing parole, in that in each case the release may be effected if there is a rea-
sonable probability that the releasee will not subsequently violate the law. The parole stat-
ute, § 259-i of the Executive Law, states that "release on parole shall ... be granted...
[only] after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released,
he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not
incompatible with the welfare of society . N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 259-i(2)(c) (McKinney
1982).
The statute governing release of youths, § 523 of the Executive Law, states that "[tlhe
division may release . . . any child ... whenever it deems such release to be in the best
interest of the child, [and when] there is a reasonable probability that the child can be
released without endangering the public safety . N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 523(i) (McKinney
1982).
210. 104 Misc. 2d 713, 429 N.Y.S.2d 362 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
211. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 523(1) (McKinney 1982). Two years after the decision in
Robilotto, this statute was amended to severely limit home visits for delinquents who have
been restrictively placed, and to provide intensive supervision following release. N.Y. ExEc.
LAW § 523(4) (McKinney 1982); FAMILY COURT Acr § 753 (McKinney 1975).
212. Robilotto, 104 Misc. 2d at 715, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
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violent crimes,"'s was negligently released. 14 The state argued
that releasing youths from state facilities was analogous to parole
releases, and thus releasing authorities are immune from liability
if the releases are done "according to law."121  The court dis-
agreed, and responded by asserting that "the pathetic state ar-
rangements" were unreasonable, and in violation of the statute.2 16
The Robilotto court expressed concern that decisions regard-
ing the temporary release of youths are administrative in nature,
and are made in a non-judicial forum: "[We] believe there is a
significant, quantum difference between a parole determination
based on a hearing and other due process and judicial-like proce-
dures on one hand and the unilateral and often routine granting
of home visit passes on the other. ' 217 Liability was pinned to the
213. The youth, Joseph Johnson, began his criminal career at age 13. At that time he
was arrested for attempted robbery. At age 14, after being abandoned by his parents and
taken in by his 20-year-old sister, Johnson was arrested three separate times within one
month for possession of stolen property, robbery and forcible rape (in which he hit the
victim in the face, threatened to kill her, and raped her) and possession of a knife. He was
then admitted to a school for boys. There, his criminal ways continued, The year before
the rape of concern in the instant case, Johnson was arrested at least three times for rob-
bery or attempted robbery, and once for possession of drugs, assault on a police officer,
burglary, petit larceny, criminal trespass and possession of stolen property. Moreover,
while at the school for boys, Johnson extorted money from weaker boys through a process
of "methodical intimidation," and was involved in at least one assault. Nevertheless, despite
a social worker's recommendation to the contrary, he was released on February 9, 1977 on
a five-day pass to visit his sister because it was believed he would be difficult to deal with if
he didn't get one. Within one hour of his arrival in New York (where his sister lived)
Johnson repeatedly raped and stabbed plaintiff. Id. at 716-18, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 364-65.
214. Id. at 714-1,-429 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
215. Id. at 719, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
216. Id. at 721, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
217. Id. at 721, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 367. In Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons and
Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977), the Arizona Supreme Court, in strong lan-
guage, held that public officials acting in other than true judicial proceedings do not have
absolute immunity in their discretionary functions. Although suit against the state was
barred, the court's discussion on public official immunity for Parole Board members is
instructive
While leaving intact the absolute judicial immunity enjoyed by participants in
judicial proceedings, we now abolish the absolute immunity previously granted
to public officials in their discretionary functions.
We have come to this conclusion because of the increasing power of the
bureaucracy-the administrators-in our society. The authority wielded by so-
called faceless bureaucrats has often been criticized. Comparing the relatively
small number of judges with the large numbers of administrators, the idea of
fearless, unbridled decision-making becomes less appealing. While society may
want and need courageous, independent policy decisions among high level gov-
RELEASE OF DANGEROUS INMATES
state's "breach of clear duty" and the presence of foreseeable
harm resulting from such breach.21
Other recent cases have recognized this problem by requiring
that a judgment to release an inmate be made only after "careful
examination." In Clark v. State,21 9 plaintiff filed suit against the
state for injuries sustained when she was inexplicably attacked by
an outpatient at a state-operated mental health facility. The out-
patient, John Lynch, had a history of multiple attempted suicides,
violence and abusiveness toward others, and was medically diag-
nosed as paranoid schizophrenic. In February 1978, Lynch's ther-
apist, a Dr. Murphy, was alerted to the fact that Lynch's condition
was deteriorating. Although Murphy examined Lynch and found
him to be actively psychotic and hallucinating, he felt that Lynch
was not in need of hospitalization. Shortly thereafter, Lynch at-
tacked claimant with a knife.
The court, in imposing liability on the state for the plaintiff's
injuries, held that Dr. Murphy's decision not to hospitalize Lynch
"was not a professional medical determination because it was not
founded upon careful examination of the patient, the medical rec-
ord, and the vital information from [Lynch's nurse] at that
time."
220
In the most recent judicial pronouncement on this topic, how-
ever, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department appears to have
shifted the tide toward a resurgence of the sovereign immunity
doctrine in release cases. In Santangelo v. State,221 a youth with a
history of predominantly non-violent crimes was released from a
ernment officials, there seems to be no benefit and, indeed, great potential
harm in allowing unbridled discretion without fear of being held to account for
their actions for every single public official who exercises discretion. The more
power bureaucrats exercise over our lives, the more we need some sort of ulti-
mate responsibility to lie for their most outrageous conduct .... In this day of
increasing power wielded by government officials, absolute immunity for nonju-
dicial, nonlegislative officials is outmoded and even dangerous.
Id. at 266, 564 P.2d at 1233.
218. Robilotto, 104 Misc. 2d at 721, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
219. 99A.D.2d 616, 472 N.Y.S.2d 170 (3d Dep't 1984).
220. 99 A.D.2d at 617, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 172. See also Bell v. New York City Health &
Hospitals Corp., 90 A.D.2d 270, 456 N.Y.S.2d 787 (2d Dep't 1982) (liability imposed on
state for injuries sustained by plaintiff, a psychiatric outpatient who set himself on fire
shortly after being released from a state mental hospital).
221. 103 Misc. 2d 578, 426 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Ct. Cl. 1980), affd, 101 A.D.2d 20, 474
N.Y.S.2d 995 (4th Dep't 1984).
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minimum security facility on a temporary furlough. Shortly after
release, the youth raped plaintiff. In holding it inappropriate to
confer absolute immunity on decisions of temporary release com-
mittees, 2 22 the New York Court of Claims accepted the fact that,
historically, acts of judges are immunized. 223 However, it
continued:
The decisions of temporary release committees do not enjoy the same status
as those of a judge. . . . Concededly, there is an interest in the rehabilitation
of prisoners. . . . [However], there exists no means available to test the pro-
priety of the temporary release committee's decision. . . . [U]nlike the deci-
sion of ajudge, there is no way for the public to challenge the determination
to release, either by participation in the decision-making process or by
appeal.11
4
Having concluded that the release committee should not be
imbued with absolute judicial immunity, the court held that this
committee "has the duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid the
release of a prisoner, where to do so would create a foreseeable
risk of injury. '225 Since it was determined that the youth's violent
crime was not foreseeable, the state avoided liability.226
The trial court in Santangelo explicitly acknowledged that the
duty owed by release committees is not a general duty to govern,
but a specific duty owed to particular individuals foreseeably en-
dangered by a decision to release. It was held that "[a]lthough there
may not have been a duty to pass penal laws or to incarcerate dangerous
criminals in the first instance, once this has been done a special duty is
established. 
221 7
On appeal to the Fourth Department, the claimant contended
the lower court erred in not finding that freeing the inmate cre-
ated a foreseeable risk of injury to her.228 Affirming dismissal of
plaintiff's claim, the Court held that it need not reach the issue of
foreseeability, since actions of the Temporary Release Commitee
were of a discretionary and quasi-judicial nature for which the
222. Id. at 582, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 934. While the court noted that decisions to release
involve the exercise ofjudgment and discretion, it rejected the notion that such discretion
alone would be sufficient to immunize these decisions. Id. at 938.
223. Id. at 582, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 933.
224. Id. at 582-83, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
225. Id. at 584, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
226. Id. at 585, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 935-36.
227. Id. at 583-84, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 934-35 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
228. 101 A.D.2d 20, 474 N.Y.S.2d 995 (4th Dep't 1984).
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State enjoys absolute immunity.229
Moreover, the Fourth Department rejected the lower court's
reasoning that the informal nature of inmate releases warrants
greater scrutiny into the decisionmaking process and cuts against
application of an absolute immunity:
While procedures to be followed by the Temporary Release Committee do
not entail hearings and are less formal and in that sense less judicial than
those involved in parole release proceedings, the Temporary Release Com-
mittee must nevertheless, like a judicial officer, exercise reasoned judgment
in balancing the welfare of the applicant and the possible risks to the com-
munity in deciding whether to grant or deny temporary release and, if it is
granted, in devising an appropriate plan.23'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Denman rejected the major-
ity's position that all decisions made by state functionaries in the
exercise of discretion are entitled to absolute immunity. It was ar-
gued that this holding would serve to erase sub silentio a significant
body of law recognizing the potential liability of the State for dis-
cretionary acts.231
C. Comment on New York Perspective
In the non-release cases, it appears that the New York courts
have become increasingly suspect of immunity. Cases like Poysa
and Jones have served to restrict the applicability of sovereign im-
munity only to those cases where the act in question directly stems
from purely "governmental" action. As the basis for governmen-
tal activity shifts from a general duty to govern towards a recog-
nizable duty owed to specific individuals, the protection afforded
by the immunity doctrine is diminished. In essence, immunity
serves the same purpose in New York that it does feder-
ally-protection of the separation of powers doctrine.2  That
some New York cases 233 apply the language of planning/opera-
tional and discretionary/ministerial thus comes as no surprise.
However, New York cases which have rejected these distinctions,
like some of the more recent federal cases, 234 have demonstrated a
229. Id. at 21, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
230. Id. at 29, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 1001.
231. Id. at 29, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
232. See supra note 80.
233. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., text accompanying note 37.
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recognition that this type of analysis has the effect of protecting
activity which is not purely sovereign or judicial in nature.23
These cases have focused not on who has made the decision in
question, but rather on the nature of the decision itself.
At the very least, however, New York courts have refused to
grant total immunity, and have instead reviewed governmental de-
cisions for reasonable basis and adequate study. Application of this
"qualified" immunity affords some protection to the state, but
conversely acknowledges that all governmental decisions, however
badly made, will not be automatically protected.
Application of sovereign immunity in the release area has
been unpredictable. A majority of cases have applied a qualified
immunity test, whereby the release decision must be based on sub-
stantial support in the record in order to be protected.236 Presum-
ably, application of only a qualified immunity acknowledges judi-
cial concern that release decisions are often made without serious
reflection of the record and the potential consequences of release.
Recent cases that have emphasized the lack of a judicial-type
forum for releasing inmates have refused to allow administrators
even a qualified immunity, 237 and have instead applied traditional
tort standards in reviewing these cases. Since the premise of im-
munity is to protect high level governmental decision making, 25
immunizing hasty and imprudent release determinations disserves
the reason for the rule.
239
Nevertheless, the foothold of sovereign immunity has not
weakened easily. No sooner does the trend in release cases shift
away from protection of these essentially administrative decisions,
than an appellate court in this state holds that decisions of this
type warrant not merely a qualified, but an absolute, immunity.
Reversal of the trend toward greater scrutiny and less immu-
nity for release decisions is ill-advised. Concededly, courts must
acknowledge the concern that the fear of liability would inhibit
release of inmates who are thought to be rehabilitated. 240 But this
concern must be accounted for by application of a judicial rather
235. See generally supra notes 145-84 and accompanying text.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 186-95.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 199-227.
238. See supra text accompanying note 168.
239. See supra note 217.
240. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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than sovereign immunity. With judicial immunity, public officials
acting in a quasi-judicial capacity are immune from suit for fear
that they would otherwise be influenced by subsequent retaliatory
suits. 241 Once the judge (or quasi-judge) is immune, so too is the
state.24 2
Although sovereign immunity is inapplicable since administra-
tive releasing forums do not govern, the state might still avoid suit
through the immunity of administrators acting in their quasi-judi-
cial capacity. The critical focus is on whether or not the release
decision is made in a sufficiently judicial-like forum-meaning the
decision in the least must be made with the assistance of reports
by competent professionals who have evaluated the inmate and
the releasing body has sufficiently interviewed the inmate and has
inquired into his character and background.4 3 If the forum is suf-
,ficiently judicial-like, then the state is entitled to a qualified immu-
nity. This means that the decision to release may still be reviewed
by the courts for reasonable basis and adequate study. Questions
for review are: Did the releasing body have all the facts before it?
If so, was its decision reasonable in light of these facts? An errone-
ous decision reasonably made enjoys immunity from suit.244 In con-
trast, where the releasing forum is not sufficiently judicial-like, im-
munity must be stripped in its entirety, and the state should be
held to a standard of foreseeability. 245
Allowing only a qualified immunity demonstrates a judicial
241. See, e.g., Poysa, 102 Misc. 2d at 272, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 619-20.
242. See, e.g., Rossman v. State, 40 A.D.2d 1046, 1046-47, 338 N.Y.S.2d 916, 917 (3d
Dep't 1972); Murph v. State, 98 Misc. 2d 324, 326, 413 N.Y.S.2d 854, 856 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
243. In Robilotto, the court noted the serious lack of adequate study done on the youth
prior to release. Specifically noted was "the failure of said counselor responsible for John-
son's release to have any psychiatric studies done on this chronic if not pathological young
criminal." Robilotto, 104 Misc. 2d at 722 n.6, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 368 n.6.
Similarly, in Santangelo, the court asserted that
[T]he "Temporary Release Committee" has an obligation to make certain that
it has before it, sufficient information on an inmate's character to allow a ra-
tional decision to be made concerning the propriety of his release. If an inmate
has a history of violent behavior, the Committee is under an obligation to make
further inquiry in order to determine whether that person's release would pre-
sent a foreseeable risk to the public.
Santangelo, 103 Misc. 2d 584, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
244. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 36 A.D.2d 878, 320 N.Y.S.2d 343 (3d Dep't 1971).
245. See Robilotto v. State, 104 Misc. 2d 713, 429 N.Y.S.2d 362 (Ct. Cl. 1980). The
courts have sidestepped the built-in statutory immunity by holding that such decisions have
not been made "according to law."
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awareness that while release committees play an instrumental role
in implementing policy in a quasi-judicial manner, their decisions
are nevertheless neither purely legislative (or "governmental")
nor purely judicial.246 Unlike a legislature, release committees do
not govern. The duty involved is not a nebulous duty owed to the
general public, but rather is a duty owed to particular individuals
endangered by persons released from state institutions.47
Similarly, although these tribunals sit in judgment, proce-
dural as well as substantive inadequacies distinguish decisions to
release from judicial determinations. 248 Review of release determi-
nations for, at a minimum, substantial support and adequate study
mitigates these inadequacies and ensures a judicially acceptable
decision. Nevertheless, some protection for decisionmakers is re-
quired if the goals of promoting rehabilitation via programs such
as parole and open door treatment are to be attained.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has identified two difficulties in applying the
doctrine of sovereign immunity to the inmate release area. The
first problem is inherent in the tests for determining the applica-
bility of immunity: the so-called "discretionary function" excep-
tion in the Federal Tort Claims Act and the discretionary/minis-
terial distinction in the states. Application of these tests has
proved troublesome, if not impossible, in light of artificial line-
drawing between deeming an act as "discretionary" or "planning"
as opposed to "ministerial" or "operational." It has been shown
that these distinctions break down under close scrutiny. The hy-
246. In Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1981), it was held that judges
might not be afforded an absolute immunity were it not for the safeguards built into the
judicial process. The court noted that judges are insulated from political influence, that the
litigation process is by nature adversarial, that there exists the appeal forum to correct
error, and that there exists precedent for resolving controversies. The court concluded
that these safeguards "tend to enhance the reliability of information and the impartiality of
the decision-making process." 641 F.2d at 1300 n.9.
247. See Poysa, 102 Misc. 2d at 273, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 620-21; Grimm, 115 Ariz. at 266,
564 P.2d at 1233.
248. See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text. See also Grimm, where the court
observed that "[m]embers of the Legislature may be voted out of office-as may judges in
Arizona. Judges may be reversed by an appellate court. The Board of Pardons and Paroles,
however, has had no check on its unbridled discretion." Grimm, 115 Ariz. at 265-66, 564
P.2d at 1232-33. See also supra note 217.
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pothetical soldiers target practicing in the park249 is illustrative of
this point. Once a decision is deemed "policy" (the goal of making
soldiers better marksmen) the ministerial aspect of that "policy"
(the actual target practice) is obscured, and immunity is held to
apply. In the final analysis, courts have been forced to apply the
discretionary function exception in an ad hoc manner.
Secondly, since the purpose of sovereign immunity is to pro-
tect the notion of the separation of powers, immunity should be
applicable only when suits against the government would tend to
threaten the government's ability to govern. But holding the state
or federal government liable for negligently releasing dangerous
inmates who thereafter foreseeably commit violent crimes would
have no such effect. Liability would not assail the government's
policy of encouraging parole or open door treatment, but would
merely encourage administrative committees empowered to re-
lease inmates to conduct proper inquiries and tests, prior to re-
leasing a particular individual. Holding the government liable in
negligence for improperly releasing an inmate no more inhibits
programs such as parole and open docr treatment as holding a
police officer liable for negligently shooting an innocent bystander
would encourage the government to do away with police.
The inapplicability of sovereign immunity does not leave the
state totally unprotected. The concern that retracting immunity
will lead to a governmental fear of releasing inmates that are be-
lieved to be rehabilitated is warranted. If the release committee
has acted in a quasi-judicial capacity, it should be afforded a quali-
fied judicial immunity. This ensures judicial review into the deci-
sionmaking process of these administrative bodies. However, an
impromptu decision by an administrator to release or furlough an
inmate would not be protected since the victim has not been af-
forded the societal considerations inherent in a true judicial fo-
rum. In such a case, immunity should be stripped in its entirety,
and the court should apply traditional tort notions to determine
whether there should be liability.
Thus, the fact that immunity may not be available does not
mean that there automatically is liability. Plaintiffs must still show
negligence in the decisionmaking process. This standard might
not be fulfilled by the mere demonstration that an inmate
249. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
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foreseeably would commit the act complained of. Arguably, each
inmate who has in the past committed a violent crime would
foreseeably commit another such crime.150 Proof of negligent re-
lease should require some clear defect in the decisionmaking pro-
cess such as the failure of the release committee to consider a psy-
chologist's report that the inmate remains a danger to society, or
the knowledge by the committee that prior releases of the inmate
have resulted in the commission of crimes.
Nevertheless, while New York continues to struggle with this
issue, other states (and some courts in this state) have followed the
federal trend and have continued to apply outdated and simplistic
standards such as the discretionary/ministerial distinction. It is
unfortunate for many victims that these states have rejected the
more enlightened approach discarding these standards and have
instead adhered to the antiquated notion that the king-or more
precisely governmental institutions and administrators-can do no
wrong.
DAVID P. MARCUS
250. As to the psychiatrist's difficulty in predicting dangerousness in an individual, see
generally Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 439 (1974);
Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Con-
vincing Evidence, 29 RUTGE.Rs L. REv. 1084 (1976).
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